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THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND
PRIVATE LAW
CODY J. JACOBS*
The Second Amendment, like other federal constitutional rights, is a
restriction on government power. But what role does the Second
Amendment have to play—if any—when a private party seeks to limit the
exercise of Second Amendment rights by invoking private law causes of
action? Private law—specifically, the law of torts, contracts, and
property—has often been impacted by constitutional considerations,
though in seemingly inconsistent ways. The First Amendment places
limitations on defamation actions and other related torts, and also prevents
courts from entering injunctions that could be classified as prior restraints.
On the other hand, the First Amendment plays almost no role in
contractual litigation, even when courts are called on to enforce
contractual provisions that directly restrict speech. The Equal Protection
Clause was famously interpreted to bar the enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer, but in the years since, courts
have largely limited that case to its facts.
This Article reconciles these disparate outcomes to develop a coherent
theory of the role constitutional rights play in private law. The Article
argues that three guideposts inform whether constitutional rights are
applied to limit private law: (1) whether the private law cause of action
threatens the core of a constitutional right, (2) whether placing a
constitutional limitation on private law would impair other constitutional
rights, and (3) whether the private law imposition on constitutional rights
was freely bargained for. The Article then applies this framework to the
individual Second Amendment right recognized in District of Columbia v.
Heller by examining several areas where the right to keep and bear arms
could intersect with private law, including negligent entrustment, products
liability, and trespass.
*. Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Rick
Greenstein and Tom Lin for their helpful comments on this article.
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INTRODUCTION
Dick Heller wanted to keep a handgun in his house for self-defense
but was prevented from doing so by a District of Columbia law banning
handguns. Believing that the law was unconstitutional, he sued the District
and ultimately won a landmark decision at the Supreme Court in District of
Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment contains an
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.1 But what if Mr.
Heller had lived in an apartment subject to a restrictive covenant banning
guns? What if he wanted to carry his handgun onto an unwilling business
owner’s property? What if the manufacturer of Mr. Heller’s handgun was
sued for selling a defective product? While at first blush it may seem that
the Second Amendment would have no bearing on these “private”
restrictions on guns, every single one of them requires the involvement of a
pubic actor—the court—to give force to these restrictions.
Does the involvement of a court in enforcing these “private law”
restrictions on guns automatically mean that each of these restrictions is
subject to Second Amendment scrutiny?2 Again, the answer is not as clear
cut as it might seem. The cases dealing with the relationship between other
constitutional rights and private law have not embraced an across the board
“court-as-state-actor” theory. Instead, they have produced an inconsistent
and confusing patchwork of results with no overarching theory to explain
the different approaches employed when dealing with different
constitutional rights and different areas of private law.
This Article will attempt to fill in that gap by developing an
explanatory theory of the relationship between private law and
constitutional rights. A close examination of the case law reveals three
“guideposts” that underlie the courts’ determinations of whether to place
constitutional limitations on private law in any given context. First, courts
will only apply constitutional constraints to private law when the private
law action threatens the core of the constitutional right at issue. Second,
courts are more reluctant to apply constitutional constraints to private law
when the application of such a constraint would threaten the constitutional
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).
2. Private law is “the body of law dealing with private persons and their property and
relationships.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Of course, the question of what constitutes
private law as opposed to public law is a fraught one. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in
the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1703 (2014). This article defines private law as concerning tort,
contract, and property law doctrines, irrespective of whether the source of those doctrines in any given
situation happens to be common law or statute. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action,
80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 517 (1985).
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rights of others. Third, courts rarely apply constitutional constraints to
contracts and other voluntary agreements. This Article will use the Second
Amendment to demonstrate how these guideposts might be applied in
several areas where Second Amendment rights and private law are likely to
intersect.
Part I of this Article explores the way other individual constitutional
rights have played a role in private law litigation. Part II proposes a
theoretical framework—the Core Right Theory—that explains the
seemingly disparate ways other rights have been incorporated into private
law litigation. Part III elucidates what the core of the Second Amendment
right is through a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller and
of the Second Amendment doctrine that has developed in the lower courts
following that decision. Part IV discusses several potential areas where the
Second Amendment could be implicated in private law litigation and
applies the Core Right Theory to sketch out how courts might approach
those issues.
I. INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW:
A TANGLED PATCHWORK
The relationship between individual constitutional rights and private
law has always been a messy one. Individual constitutional rights were
traditionally thought to serve only as checks on direct exercises of
government power, and had no bearing whatsoever on private law
litigation.3 However, starting in the middle of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court began to expand the scope of constitutional rights to place
limits on private law in some areas. But this expansion has been far from
uniform. Torts imposing liability based on speech and injunctive relief that
targets speech have been given serious constitutional limitations.
Nevertheless, contractual obligations limiting speech have remained
relatively free from First Amendment scrutiny. Likewise, although a few
prominent cases have suggested otherwise, courts have been fairly reluctant
to find that the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause contain
consequential limitations on private property rights.
A. FREE SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND RELATED INTENTIONAL TORTS
Perhaps the most famous area where the Supreme Court has explicitly
placed constitutional limitations on litigation between private parties is in
3. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (noting that in
the Lochner era, the common law was thought of as a “part of nature rather than a legal construct”).
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the context of actions for defamation.4 The torts of libel and slander existed
at common law long before the First Amendment was ratified.5 And, for
over a century after the First Amendment was ratified, there was no
suggestion that the Amendment did anything to alter these torts even
though liability was triggered by the defendant’s speech.6
The Supreme Court changed that dramatically in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan.7 In that case, a public official in Alabama sued the New York
Times and several civil rights leaders for libel in Alabama state court based
on an allegedly defamatory advertisement the Times published, which
criticized the official’s handling of civil rights protests in Montgomery.8
The jury returned a hefty verdict for the plaintiff after being instructed by
the trial judge that the statements in the advertisement were libel per se and
that no proof of intentional falsity was required.9 The Supreme Court of
Alabama upheld the jury verdict and rejected the defendants’ argument that
the jury instructions violated the First Amendment.10
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the First Amendment
limited libel actions by requiring that—when the plaintiff is a public
figure—the plaintiff must prove that the allegedly defamatory material was
published by the defendant with “‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”11
The Court rejected any distinction between libel actions between private
parties and other kinds of state action:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action . . . . The test
4. Defamation refers to two separate torts: libel and slander. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 568 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
5. See, e.g., Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind
the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 42 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1656 (2009). But see Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original
Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251 (2010) (arguing that
courts and commentators did understand tort actions as state action for purposes of the First
Amendment and state constitutional analogues at the time of the founding, but that they simply
considered defamation to be outside the scope of the First Amendment).
7. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
8. Id. at 256–65.
9. Id. The jury awarded $500,000 in damages against the defendants, which is nearly $4
million in today’s dollars. See U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com
(last visited Aug. 11, 2017).
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (Ala. 1962).
11. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
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is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has in fact been exercised. . . . What a State
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. 12

In the years following Sullivan, the Court extended the protection of
the actual malice requirement to situations where the defamation plaintiff is
any “public figure,” even if they are not a public official.13 Although the
Court declined to extend the full protection of Sullivan to suits involving
non-public-figure plaintiffs, it did hold that the First Amendment requires
such plaintiffs to prove some sort of fault on the part of the defendant in
publishing the defamatory statement where the statement involves a matter
of public concern,14 displacing the common law rule of strict liability.15
The Court also held that non-public-figure plaintiffs could not recover
punitive or presumed damages16 for defamation unless they satisfied the
Sullivan actual malice standard.17 The Court also required that where the
allegedly defamatory speech deals with a matter of public concern, the
burden of proof for showing falsity must be on the plaintiff.18 Finally, the
Court established that the First Amendment requires appellate courts to
undertake an independent examination of whether the actual malice test is
satisfied when reviewing a trial court’s judgment in a defamation case
where that standard applies.19
The scope of other intentional torts involving speech has also been
limited by the First Amendment. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the
Court held that a public figure plaintiff could not recover damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on speech unless the
underlying speech contained a false statement of fact made with actual
malice.20 Similarly, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the court held that actual malice
was also required in false light type actions involving issues of public
concern.21 And, in Snyder v. Phelps, the court refused to allow recovery on
claims for intentional inflection of emotional distress and intrusion upon
12. Id. at 265, 277 (citations omitted).
13. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 & n.7 (1974).
14. See id. at 347.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
16. Presumed damages are damages that are recoverable for defamation without any proof of
actual loss. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
17. See id. at 348–50.
18. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
19. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685–86 (1989); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984).
20. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
21. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967).
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seclusion based on activities associated with picketing in a public space.22
The Court has also limited the use of the tort of public disclosure of private
facts, foreclosing the imposition of liability where the facts disclosed
appear in a public record.23
However, not all torts involving speech have been subject to First
Amendment restrictions. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
the Court held that the First Amendment placed no limitation on actions for
the appropriation of the right of publicity.24 The Court noted that while
actions for defamation and false light sought to silence speech, actions for
appropriation of the right of publicity were simply about “who gets to do
the publishing.”25 Thus, the Court concluded that the performer of a human
cannonball act could recover against a news station that broadcast his entire
act without compensating him.26
B. FREE SPEECH AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The First Amendment also places limits on the kinds of equitable
relief available to prevailing parties in private law litigation. Injunctions
that prohibit defendants from engaging in speech can, in some
circumstances, be classified by courts as prior restraints, and therefore be
subjected to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.27 “The term prior restraint
is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.”28 Although the Supreme Court has never
established the specific standard that applies to the review of prior
restraints,29 it has held that such restraints carry “a ‘heavy presumption’
against [their] constitutional validity” and that the party attempting to
justify the restraint “carries a heavy burden.”30
In the private law context, concerns about prior restraints most often
22. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456, 460 (2011).
23. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975).
24. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
25. Id. at 573. The court also noted that these actions preserved similar economic interests to
actions for copyright infringement, which posed no First Amendment problem. See id. at 575–77.
26. Id. at 578.
27. See, e.g., Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1241 (2000) (“[Court] [o]rders which
restrict or preclude a citizen from speaking in advance are known as ‘prior restraints,’ and are
disfavored and presumptively invalid.”) (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971)).
28. E.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted).
29. See, e.g., J.Q. Office Equip. of Omaha, Inc. v. Sullivan, 432 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Neb. 1988).
30. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations omitted).
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arise in lawsuits involving defamation, harassment, or trade secrets where
the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent the defendant from
continuing to engage in offending conduct that involves at least some
element of speech. The level of scrutiny courts apply to such injunctions
varies depending primarily on two factors: (1) whether the injunction is
content-based, and (2) whether the injunction forbids speech on a matter of
public concern. Speech restrictive injunctions which are content-based are
subject to strict scrutiny,31 while injunctions that are not content-based are
subject to a lesser standard akin to intermediate scrutiny.32 Although the
role it plays in the analysis is less clear, courts are also less likely to grant
injunctive relief that would suppress speech on matters of public concern.
The court’s purpose in adopting the injunction is the controlling
consideration in determining content neutrality.33 If the injunction was
adopted for a purpose other than suppressing the message the speaker
intended to convey, it is content neutral.34 In DVD Copy Control
Association, Inc. v. Bunner, the Supreme Court of California upheld an
injunction preventing the publication of proprietary computer code that was
found to be a trade secret of the plaintiff.35 The court reasoned that the
communication of the computer code was singled out not because of its
message, but because of the plaintiff’s property interest in the code.36 The
court went on to find that the injunction served a significant government
interest—allowing trade secret owners to “reap the fruits of [their] own
labor”—and that the injunction burdened no more speech than necessary to
further that purpose, since the only way to protect trade secrets is to prevent
them from becoming public.37 Similarly, in Rew v. Bergstrom, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals justified a protective order barring the
defendant from contacting the plaintiff, a domestic violence victim,
“because it restrict[ed] contact with the abuse victim initiated by the
abusing party without regard for the message the abusing party intend[ed]
31. Strict scrutiny requires that the injunction be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 862 (2009).
32. See DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 877 (2003). The standard for
reviewing content-neutral injunctions that burden speech asks whether the injunction “burden[s] no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health
Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted).
33. See Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 877.
34. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763; Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 877.
35. See Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 864, 885.
36. See id. at 877. See also In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(upholding injunction preventing the dissemination of proprietary company documents illegally
retained after discovery because “[t]he injunction [was] justified not by reference to the content of the
covered documents, but rather by their unlawful acquisition.”).
37. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th at 880–81 (citations omitted).

THE SECOND AMENDMENT & PRIVATE LAW [JACOBS SSRN].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE LAW

9/7/2017 1:18 PM

953

to express.”38 Courts have been similarly willing to enter content-neutral
injunctions restricting speech in the copyright context39 and in the context
of harassment by protesters.40
By contrast, in Franklin Chalfont Associates v. Kalikow, a
Pennsylvania court refused to uphold an injunction preventing home
owners who were dissatisfied with the real estate developer who sold them
their homes from criticizing his business through picketing, leafleting, and
displaying signs in other ways.41 The developer alleged that the home
owners’ activities constituted tortious interference with his business and
that the injunction was necessary to prevent that interference and to protect
the developer and his customers from the defendants’ “offensive”
signage.42 The court rejected those arguments noting that “the
injunction . . . was directed at the content rather than the manner of
appellants’ speech” because it only prevented the home owners from
engaging in “speech and other expressive conduct which [was] critical of
[the developer]. It [was] directed against the ideas expressed because of the
detrimental impact which the communication of those ideas . . . had upon
[the developer].”43 Similarly, in Shang Jen Lo v. Shu Ping Chan, the
California Court of Appeals reversed an injunction preventing disgruntled
former church parishioners “from approaching, yelling out, or calling out to
parishioners concerning respondent or other church officials from [a
nearby] parking lot on any day church services are held” because the court
found it to be a content-based restriction on speech, since it solely restricted
speech that concerned the church.44
38. Rew v. Bergstrom, 812 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014).
39. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987)
(upholding injunction prohibiting certain uses of the word “Olympic” because any “restrictions on
expressive speech” were “incidental” to the primary purpose of “encouraging and rewarding the [U.S.
Olympic Committee’s] activities.”).
40. See, e.g., Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The
injunction at issue here is content-neutral. . . . The challenged sections of the injunction make no
mention whatsoever of abortion or any other substantive issue—they merely restrict the volume,
location, timing, and violent or intimidating nature of his expressive activity.”); Murray v. Lawson, 649
A.2d 1253, 1263 (N.J. 1994) (upholding an injunction preventing picketing near the home of a doctor
who provided abortions on the ground that “the court granted it to protect the [doctor and his family]
from targeted picketing that inherently and offensively interfered with their residential privacy” rather
than to suppress the message of the protesters).
41. Franklin Chalfont Assocs. v. Kalikow, 573 A.2d 550, 550–52, 557–58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
42. Id. at 554–57.
43. Id. at 557 (emphasis omitted).
44. Shang Jen Lo v. Shu Ping Chan, Nos. B261883, B261885, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
9426, at *15 (Dec. 30, 2015). See also, e.g., Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. L.A. Times Commc’ns
LLC, 239 Cal. App. 4th 808, 824 (2015) (finding proposed injunction against the release of allegedly
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Courts have also shown a reluctance to enter or uphold injunctions
that burden speech on matters of public concern. In Rain CII Carbon, LLC
v. Kurczy, for example, a federal district court refused to enjoin the release
by a journalist of certain financial information that the plaintiff—a major
chemical company—alleged were trade secrets.45 The court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that trade secrets were inherently matters of purely
private concern, finding that the financials of a major chemical company
were a matter in which the public would have important interests.46 By
contrast, in Evilsizor v. Sweeney, the California Court of Appeal upheld an
injunction preventing a man from publishing text messages obtained from
his wife’s phone in order to harass her.47 The court faulted the defendant
for failing to “identif[y] any public concern in [his wife’s] text messages
and other information that he surreptitiously took from her phones.”48
The focus on whether speech restricting injunctions in private law
litigation are content-neutral and whether they involve matters of public
concern mirrors the focus on these issues in other aspects of First
Amendment doctrine. The practice of distinguishing between contentneutral and content-based restrictions on speech and applying greater
scrutiny to the latter has been called “the keystone of First Amendment
law.”49 This is because “the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment” is that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message,” and content-based restrictions on speech threaten that
choice.50 Similarly, the question of whether a restriction impacts speech on
confidential information about police department employees not “‘content-neutral’ at all); Animal
Rights Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing
injunction in tortious interference with business relationships case that prevented an animal rights group
from making certain specific statements criticizing the plaintiff).
45. Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. Kurczy, No. 12-2014, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116865, at *8–9
(E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2012).
46. Id. at *5. See also New.net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1085–86 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (finding that a software company’s labeling of another company’s product as spyware was
speech on a matter of public concern—internet privacy—and refusing to enjoin that speech in an action
alleging libel and several business torts); VI 4D, LLLP v. Crucians in Focus, Inc., 57 V.I. 143, 160
(Super. Ct. 2012) (refusing to enjoin the release of trade secrets obtained from a confidential executive
summary submitted to a government agency in connection with an application for tax benefits, on the
grounds that the application dealt with an issue of public concern).
47. Evilsizor v. Sweeney (In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney), 237 Cal. App. 4th 1416,
1428 (2015).
48. Id.
49. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996). See also Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for
Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1263 n.2 (2014)
(collecting sources making similar claims).
50. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). See
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matters of public concern has often been important to the Supreme Court in
determining the validity of speech restrictions under the First Amendment.
As the Court has observed on several occasions, “speech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection” because “[s]peech on matters of public
concern . . . is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”51 By
contrast, “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First
Amendment protections are often less rigorous” because such restrictions
pose less of a “threat to the free and robust debate of public issues.”52
C. FREE SPEECH AND CONTRACTS
In stark contrast with the robust role the First Amendment plays in tort
actions, the Supreme Court has said relatively little about the role the First
Amendment may play, if any, in regulating contractual obligations.53 In
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that a cause of action
for promissory estoppel based on a newspaper’s decision to break a
promise by revealing the identity of a confidential source could constitute
state action subject to First Amendment restrictions.54 The Court reasoned:
[I]f Cohen could recover at all it would be on the theory of promissory
estoppel, a state-law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates
obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties. These legal
obligations would be enforced through the official power of the
Minnesota courts. Under our cases, that is enough to constitute “state
action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.55

The Court’s reasoning here is a bit cryptic in terms of what it means
for the broader universe of contractual claims that may implicate the First
Amendment. Some have argued that claims of promissory estoppel and
breach of contract are sufficiently similar to justify extending the logic of
Cohen to contract claims.56 Others have argued that the Court’s dicta
mentioning the “absence of a contract” means that the logic of Cohen does
not extend to contract claims where there are contractual obligations
also Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1316 (“[S]trong content neutrality provides robust political bulwarks for
free expression.”).
51. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
52. Id. (citation omitted).
53. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 350 (1998).
54. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).
55. Id.
56. See Garfield, supra note 53, at 350–52.
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“explicitly assumed by the parties.”57
The argument over the meaning of this passage is largely irrelevant in
practice because Cohen’s purported “application” of the First Amendment
was so toothless as to render it virtually irrelevant in contract actions.58 The
Court found that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is “a law of
general applicability” that “does not target or single out the press” the First
Amendment did not “forbid its application to the press.”59 Thus, the Court
found no constitutional issue with the promissory estoppel action in that
case.60
This explanation is less than satisfying since the common law causes
of action for defamation and other torts are also laws of general
applicability.61 Why then, does the First Amendment place such strict
restrictions on torts that impact speech but take such a hands-off approach
to contracts? One plausible explanation for this differential treatment is that
the consensual nature of a contractual agreement operates essentially as a
waiver of whatever First Amendment rights would otherwise be implicated
by lawsuits arising out of contracts. In other words, lawsuits to enforce
contracts may constitute state action, but the state is free to suppress speech
where the defendant has consented to the suppression of that speech
through a contract (or, as in Cohen, through a legally enforceable promise).
Many scholars and courts have embraced this approach to
understanding the distinction between Cohen and cases like Sullivan.62
57. Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 63–65 (1995). See also JW & JJ Entm’t, LLC v. Sandler, No. 8:13-CV01609-AW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138107, at *10 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2013) (“Although court enforcement of
state law doctrines in a manner alleged to violate the First Amendment may constitute governmental
action, a court’s adverse enforcement of contractual obligations that a party explicitly assumes does not
constitute governmental action.”).
58. See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1661–63.
59. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
60. Id. at 671–72.
61. See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1675 (“[T]he generally applicable law approach
does not explain the difference in treatment between tort and contract, because the approach provides
no explanation why some bodies of law are defined at a greater level of generality than others.”).
Indeed, some courts have taken Cohen as an invitation to subject activities that would ordinarily be
subject to First Amendment protection to non-defamation tort liability, on the theory that such torts are
also “generally applicable laws.” See, e.g., Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392, 404 (W.D. Tex.
1996) (applying the Cohen “law of general applicability” standard to a negligence action against media
defendants arising out of newsgathering activities); Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock A Right:
Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1135, 1191–1200 (1997) (collecting cases relying on the “law of general applicability”
language to subject newsgathering activities to tort liability).
62. See, e.g., Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 681–82 (Conn. 2009); Garfield, supra note
53, at 354–55; Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering Torts and
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However, some have questioned this reasoning on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine dealing with contracts private
parties make directly with the government that involve the waiver of
constitutional rights.63 In what has become known as the unconstitutionalconditions doctrine, the Court has repeatedly held that the First
Amendment places limits on the government’s ability to extract waivers of
constitutional rights in agreements it makes with private parties, even when
a private party would voluntarily agree to such a waiver.64 If First
Amendment rights cannot be completely waived in a contract with the
government, why can they be waived in other contracts?
The best answer to this question is that the government has unique
powers that give it an inherent bargaining advantage that other parties
simply do not have.65 As the Court has put it in explaining the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “[i]f the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited.”66 This is not true of other contracting parties, who can
simply find someone else to bargain with if the terms are not agreeable. Of
course, there are certainly arguments to be made against that distinction,
especially in situations where the private party seeking the waiver of free
speech rights has a vast bargaining power advantage over the other private
party.67 Nevertheless, the coercion rationale does explain why the Court on
the one hand subjects private contracts involving speech to virtually no
constitutional scrutiny, while on the other hand carefully restricts the
government’s ability to extract speech-limiting concessions from the
the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 557–58 (1998); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057, 1061 (2000). See also Solove &
Richards, supra note 6, at 1675–76 (“One of the most widely accepted approaches for determining
when civil liability triggers the First Amendment is to look to whether a person has consented to the
waiver of her First Amendment rights.”).
63. See Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1678.
64. See id. at 1678–79 & n.154 (collecting cases).
65. See, e.g., Solove & Richards, supra note 6, at 1679 (“Treating the government and private
parties as equivalent overlooks the danger that the government could use its vast resources to buy up
constitutional rights.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1451 (1989) (“In several respects, government poses greater danger than private parties of coercion,
however defined.”).
66. O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996) (quotations and
citations omitted).
67. For example, companies often force employees to sign non-disclosure agreements as a
condition of employment—a situation where most potential employees have little, if any, bargaining
leverage. See Garfield, supra note 53, at 285–86.
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private parties with which it bargains.
D. FREE SPEECH AND TRESPASS
Like in the tort context, in the property context the Court took a
seemingly radical step toward placing First Amendment restrictions on
private law in a famous mid-twentieth-century case, Marsh v. Alabama.68
However, unlike the watershed decision in Sullivan, Marsh proved to be
the high-water mark of the Court’s willingness to limit private property
owners’ ability to curtail free speech.
In Marsh, the Court reviewed the criminal trespass conviction of a
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses who was distributing literature on the
sidewalks of Chickasaw, Alabama.69 Chickasaw was a “company town”
where all the property, including the streets, sidewalks, and utilities, were
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company.70 The Court held that, despite
the town’s status as private property, the defendant’s conduct was
nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.71 The Court reasoned that:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the
owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not
operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their
operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation.72

Although Marsh involved a prosecution for criminal trespass, the
restrictions it announced on the exclusion of disfavored speakers from
certain kinds of private property applied equally to efforts to do so through
civil trespass suits.73
The Court built on Marsh twenty-four years later in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.74 In that
68. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
69. Id. at 502–04.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 506–09.
72. Id. at 506.
73. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union, Local
No. 31, 394 P.2d 921, 924 (Cal. 1964) (relying on Marsh to deny relief to the owner of a shopping
center in a trespass action against union protesters); Blue Ridge Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 432
S.W.2d 610, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (same).
74. Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 308
(1968), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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case, the Court reversed an injunction preventing a union from picketing in
front of a privately owned shopping center containing a grocery store the
union felt was treating workers unfairly.75 The Court held that the shopping
center bore “striking similarities” to the company town in Marsh in that
both were relatively large commercial areas to which the general public had
unrestricted access.76 However, just a few years later, the Court backed
away from Marsh and Logan Valley. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court
reversed an injunction allowing groups opposed to the Vietnam War to pass
out leaflets at a privately owned shopping center against the will of the
owners.77 The Court distinguished Logan Valley on the grounds that the
picketing in that case involved a matter directly related to the operation of
the store.78 However, the Court’s language made clear that it was skeptical
of the entire premise of Logan Valley. For example, it noted with alarm that
the “open to the public” rationale “would apply in varying degrees to most
retail stores and service establishments across the country” and that private
property does not “lose its private character merely because the public is
generally invited to use it for designated purposes.”79
A few Terms later, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court took the next step
and explicitly overruled Logan Valley.80 The Court did not overrule Marsh
but instead distinguished the company town in Marsh from the shopping
centers in these later cases because “the owner of the company town was
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and stood in the shoes of
the State” while the shopping center owners were not.81 Since Hudgens, it
has been well settled that there are essentially no federal82 constitutional
limits on what speakers and messages private property owners can exclude
from their property, whether the exclusion is accomplished through
criminal or civil means.83
75. Id. at 325.
76. Id. at 318–19.
77. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561–62, 569 (1972).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 565–66, 596.
80. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
81. Id. at 519 (quotations and citation omitted).
82. A few state constitutional free speech provisions have been interpreted to follow some
version of the Logan Valley rule. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal.
1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994).
83. The only exceptions have come in cases where the private property at issue was specifically
designated for public use independent of its business-related use, either by historical practice or by
explicit agreement with government authorities. See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint
Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 943–44, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2001) (extending First Amendment
protection to protesters on a privately owned sidewalk that the owner was required to open to the public
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Why did First Amendment restrictions on defamation actions become
entrenched while First Amendment restrictions on trespass actions proved
so fleeting? Part of the answer may lie in the Court’s concern that
recognizing a First Amendment right to speak on others’ property threatens
other constitutional interests—namely the rights of property owners under
the Fifth Amendment.84 The Court’s desire to provide breathing space for
the exercise of another constitutional right—a concern not present in the
defamation context85—at least partially explains why it was more reluctant
to use the First Amendment to limit trespass actions.86 However, the
continuing validity of Marsh and the Court’s willingness to allow state
constitutional free speech guarantees to limit trespass actions87 show that
concern for property rights does not provide a complete explanation.
Another factor that helps fill this gap are the important differences
between the First Amendment interests threatened by defamation torts and
trespass actions. As discussed in Part I.B, First Amendment doctrine has
long made a distinction between mere “time, place, and manner”
restrictions that simply tell speakers where and when they can speak and
“content-based” restrictions, which restrict what a speaker can speak
about.88 Laws falling into the latter category are generally subject to much
more rigorous scrutiny than laws in the former category. 89 Defamation
actions are, in essence, content-based restrictions on speech; they punish a
speaker for speaking about a particular subject—the person being
as a condition of constructing its business, and collecting similar cases).
84. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567–68 (1972) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and prohibition on taking “private property . . . for public use,
without just compensation” were “relevant to this case,” and that “[a]lthough accommodations between
the values protected by [the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments] are sometimes necessary . . . this
Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech
on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”).
85. Although some countries have a constitutional right associated with reputational harm, the
United States does not. See Mark Tushnet, New York Times v. Sullivan Around the World, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 337, 352–53 (2014) (“As a result, in other constitutional systems, libel law involves a conflict
between constitutional rights, and the courts’ task is to achieve the best accommodation of rights that
exist on the same conceptual plane. In contrast, in the United States the right to reputation is a mere
social interest, no different from any other legislatively-favored value but conceptually always
subordinated to constitutional rights.”)
86. See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570 (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private
property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights of all citizens, must be respected and protected.
The Framers of the Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental rights of a free society are
incompatible with each other.”).
87. See Robins, 447 U.S. at 80–85.
88. See, e.g., 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 957 (2017).
89. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
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defamed.90
By contrast, the content neutrality question is more complex in a
trespass action. A property owner may use trespass actions to exclude
speakers with a particular message while allowing other speakers to
remain. In that sense, trespass actions look like content-based restrictions
on speech. However, because a private property owner can only control his
or her own property, excluded speakers are left with plenty of other places
to get their message out, making trespass actions seem much more like a
time, place, and manner restriction.91 In a defamation action, by contrast,
the speaker will be punished for speaking about the person being defamed
no matter where the speech occurs.
To be sure, time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by the
government ordinarily cannot discriminate based on subject matter even if
they leave ample alternative channels for speech about that subject.92 But,
when combined with the Court’s concern for the constitutional rights of
private property owners, the fact that trespass actions do not completely
snuff out speech based on its content provides a helpful explanatory tool
for understanding the Court’s approach.
E. EQUAL PROTECTION, COVENANTS, WILLS, AND TRUSTS
As described above, the Court’s application of the First Amendment to
private law has been—at best—somewhat inconsistent. Things get even
more convoluted when the Court’s approach to applying the Equal
Protection Clause to private law is considered. In Shelley v. Kraemer,93 the
Court confronted the issue of how the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to racially restrictive covenants—that is,
covenants that prevent the sale of land to, or occupation of land by, racial
minorities.94 The Court’s answer was surprising: the covenant itself is a
private matter that does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, but any
attempt to enforce the covenant in court does implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment. This rationale would potentially implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment (and perhaps other constitutional provisions) in virtually every
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. A key factor in the Court’s test for evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions imposed
by the government in public forums is whether or not the restrictions “leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.” E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citation omitted).
92. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 957.
93. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 1 (1948).
94. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
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contract, since contracts are only effective to the extent they are
enforceable.95 However, as discussed below, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have declined to take Shelley nearly so far—leaving generations of
scholars to attempt to rationalize this apparent outlier.
In Shelley, white landowners in two consolidated cases were
attempting to enforce racially restrictive covenants against black people
who purchased land allegedly subject to the covenants.96 The black
purchasers argued that the enforcement of the covenants violated the Equal
Protection Clause, while the land owners argued that the private covenants
were not subject to any constitutional restrictions.97 The Court first held,
that “[s]o long as [racially restrictive covenants are] effectuated by
voluntary adherence to their terms . . . there has been no action by the State
and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.”98 However,
the Court found that here, there was “action by the state” in the form of the
court orders the landowners sought to enforce the covenants.99
The Court reasoned that “but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint.”100 The
Court rejected the argument that the discriminatory policy’s source—a
private agreement—had any impact on the analysis, finding that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not “ineffective simply because the particular
pattern of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined
initially by the terms of a private agreement.”101 The Court ended its
analysis by noting that:
Whatever else the framers [of the Fourteenth Amendment] sought to
achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the
establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political
rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on
the part of the States based on considerations of race or color. 102

As many scholars have pointed out, the apparent breadth of Shelley’s
95. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007) (“Shelley’s approach, ‘consistently applied, would require
individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever individuals might
later seek the security of judicial enforcement, as is often the case.’”) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988)).
96. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–8.
97. Id. at 7–8, 14.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 23.
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holding is striking and perhaps even disturbing.103 Virtually all private
decisions are in some way or another, only possible because of the threat of
some kind of judicial enforcement of those decisions.104 Thus, taken to its
logical conclusion, Shelley’s rationale would subject nearly all private
decision-making to constitutional constraints.105
Of course, as the discussion above of the First Amendment’s
application to contract and trespass actions demonstrates, the Supreme
Court and lower courts have not followed Shelley to its logical conclusion
in all areas of constitutional law.106 In fact, courts have not taken this broad
view of Shelley even in the limited context of private law cases involving
the Equal Protection Clause.107 Although a few years later, in Barrows v.
Jackson, the Court applied its holding in Shelley to bar a lawsuit for
damages against a white person for violating a racially restrictive covenant
by selling his home to a non-white person, in subsequent years the Court
has all but ignored Shelley, even in cases involving racial discrimination.108
In fact, the Court has not applied Shelley to any private law dispute at all in
the more than sixty years since Barrows was decided.
Lower courts have also been reluctant to expand Shelley or even take
its reasoning at face value.109 For example, in Shapira v. Union National
Bank, an Ohio court found no constitutional problem with the enforcement
of a will provision conditioning the receipt of certain property on the
testator’s son marrying a Jewish person.110 The court reasoned that unlike
the complete deprivation of the ability to buy the property in Shelley, the
103. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 524–25; Thomas F. Guernsey, The Mentally
Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 442–43 (1984); Thomas P.
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1109 (1960); Rosen, supra note 95, at
453; Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; A Time for
Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 82–84 (1998). See also Darrell A.H. Miller, State Domas,
Neutral Principles, and the Möbius of State Action, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 967, 972 & n.28 (2008) (“The
problem with Shelley—as noted even by those who agreed with its result—was the potentially
intolerable breadth of the reasoning.”) (collecting sources).
104. See Saxer, supra note 103, at 101 (“For example, if I decide to invite only women to my
house for a Tupperware party and three men walk into my house uninvited, I cannot call the sheriff to
have them removed as trespassers without risking liability for violating their rights under the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
105. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 524–25.
106. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 95, at 459–60.
107. See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 103, at 442 (noting “the Supreme Court’s reluctance since
Shelley to expand its holding beyond restrictive covenants having racial overtones”).
108. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254, 260 (1953); Rosen, supra note 95, at 462–66
(describing the Court’s reluctance to apply Shelley’s rationale in several cases involving racial
discrimination).
109. See Rosen, supra note 95 at 469.
110. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 825–28 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
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court’s decision to enforce the will would not completely deprive the son of
the right to marry.111 The court observed that “[i]f the . . . aid of this court
were sought to enjoin [the son’s] marrying a non-Jewish girl, then the
doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would be applicable . . . .”112 However, this
reasoning makes little sense. Just as the Shapira court noted the son had no
right to inherit anything at all, neither did the property purchasers in Shelley
have any right to purchase or own property.113 Rather, the right that was
violated in Shelley was the right to have an equal opportunity to purchase
property—a right which enforcing the covenant would clearly have
violated. Similarly, the right at issue in Shapira was the son’s right to the
same opportunity to inherit his father’s property irrespective of his choice
of who to marry. Nevertheless, Shapira expresses the majority rule that
discriminatory will or trust provisions are generally valid.114 Other courts
have been similarly skeptical of using Shelley to apply the Equal Protection
Clause in private law disputes, including in cases involving the use of
restrictive covenants to bar the construction of churches and the
construction of group homes for the elderly and disabled.115
The few courts that have applied Shelley have done so primarily in
situations involving race discrimination or where a neutral covenant is
enforced in a discriminatory manner.116 In Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park
111. Id. at 827–28.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 828.
114. See Aaron H. Kaplan, Note, The “Jewish Clause” and Public Policy: Preserving the
Testamentary Right to Oppose Religious Intermarriage, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 311 (2010).
115. See, e.g., Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 259–60 (1st Cir. 1993)
(refusing to apply Shelley to the enforcement of a restrictive covenant barring anything other than single
family homes against a group home for the elderly because the covenant was “facially neutral”);
Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234–35 (Mass. 1955) (upholding will provision barring son from
receiving property if he marries a non-Jewish person); Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358
N.Y.S.2d 477, 481–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), (upholding the use against religious institutions of a
restrictive covenant barring non-residential property use), aff’d, 325 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Shaver v.
Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. App. 1981) (upholding “single family home” covenant since
allowing the construction of a group home for the disabled would give “preferred treatment to the
handicapped”); Ireland v. Bible Baptist Church, 480 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (upholding
restrictive covenant barring the construction of churches because it “applied equally to churches of all
denominations and faiths”). But see Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, 751–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)
(upholding restrictive covenant barring persons under twenty-one from a development but only after
concluding that the restriction was “reasonably related to a legitimate purpose”).
116. See, e.g., Spencer v. Flint Mem’l Park Ass’n, 144 N.W.2d 622, 628–30 (Mich. Ct. App.
1966); W. Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1969). See also
White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351–52 (Fla. 1979) (“[W]e find the restriction
against children under the age of twelve reasonably related to a lawful objective, but under the
circumstances of this case the selective and arbitrary manner of enforcement is another issue.”); Preston
Tower Condo. Ass’n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding
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Association, the court refused to enforce a cemetery’s rule that would have
prohibited the holder of burial rights from burying a non-white person in
the cemetery.117 The court found that Shelley’s analysis applied with equal
force to the enforcement of this discriminatory restriction as it did to
restrictive real property covenants.118 Interestingly, the court went out of its
way to note that it is “absolutely clear that [the court’s] conclusion in no
way prevents cemeteries maintained by a particular religious faith from
restricting burial rights to members of that faith,” since “[f]rom time
immemorial cemeteries and interment in them have had a close
identification with religion.”119 In West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, the
court refused to enforce a covenant forbidding the non-residential use of
certain property against a church where the holders of the covenant had
attempted to enforce the covenant only against certain churches and not
others.120
Scholars who maintain that Shelley was correctly decided121 have
struggled for decades to rationalize Shelley and the cases that followed.122
As Mark Rosen describes it, “[s]cholarly explanations of Shelley fall into
two broad camps. . . . [one which] understands Shelley’s problematic
analytics as a reflection of the inherent weakness of the distinction between
public and private action,” and therefore further evidence of the need to
eliminate that distinction, and another group which has “sought to justify
Shelley. . . in a way that preserves the public/private distinction.”123 This
Article is largely unconcerned with the first group, since courts have
continued to enthusiastically embrace a public/private distinction in
constitutional law124 and this Article’s goal is explanatory rather than
normative.125
condominium age limitation, but remanding for a determination of whether the enforcement of the
limitation was arbitrary).
117. Spencer, 144 N.W.2d at 628–30.
118. Id. at 628–29.
119. Id.
120. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d at 196–202.
121. Some take the position that it was not correctly decided (or at least should not have been
decided on constitutional grounds). See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 103, at 119–20.
122. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 95, at 454.
123. Id. at 470.
124. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value
of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2000)
(“[C]ourts show no sign of discarding the [state-action] doctrine.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1982) (“[T]he public/private dichotomy
[is still] alive and, if anything, growing in influence.”).
125.
It would be worth considering, however, what the complete abandonment of the
public/private distinction would mean in a post-Heller world, since a lot of the scholarship arguing for
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Scholars arguing for limiting Shelley in a way that preserves the
public/private distinction have come up with a number of limiting
principles.126 Thomas Lewis and others have argued that Shelley can be
understood as a case where the power of zoning—a state function—was
delegated to private parties through the enforcement of the restrictive
covenants.127 In other words, Shelley is just an extension of the principle
announced in Marsh: when private actors step into the government’s shoes,
constitutional restrictions apply to those actors.128 However, given the
Court’s reluctance to extend Marsh, discussed in Part I.D, the result in
Shelley seems more anomalous. Moreover, this theory fails to account for
courts’ reluctance to expand Shelley to other restrictive covenants where
private parties have stepped into the role of zoning authorities at least as
much as the covenant enforcing parties were attempting to do in Shelley.129
Others have argued that the result in Shelley can be explained by the
impact the covenant there had on persons who were not parties to the
original covenant.130 However, while this may be a partial explanation, this
account also proves too much: nearly all covenants will affect people not
subject to them; that is the whole point—they run with the land. Also, the
same thing is true of many private agreements that courts have not
subjected to constitutional constraints. For example, settlement agreements
barring a party from speaking about litigation have generally been upheld
despite their impact on the rights of potential listeners who were not parties
to those agreements.131
Another theory is that Shelley is essentially limited to its facts—that it
only concerns racially restrictive covenants. This theory is—at least
implicitly—the most widely adopted by courts132 and therefore correct as a
descriptive matter. However, as Spencer shows, at least where race
the abandonment of that distinction predates Heller.
126. See Rosen, supra note 95, at 474–83.
127. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 103, at 1115–16; Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past
Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 849–50 (1983).
128. See Lewis, supra note 103, at 1115–16.
129.
If anything, the cases discussed above involving “residential property” restrictions are much
more analogous to zoning regulations than the covenants in Shelley, since they concern the use of the
land rather than who is allowed to occupy it.
130. See Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: The
Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37, 68 (2007); Burt Neuborne, Ending
Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 194–96 (2015).
131. See Rosen, supra note 95, at 458–59.
132. See, e.g., Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition
of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 493 & n.140 (1998) (collecting cases).

THE SECOND AMENDMENT & PRIVATE LAW [JACOBS SSRN].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND PRIVATE LAW

9/7/2017 1:18 PM

967

discrimination is involved, courts have occasionally followed Shelley in
contexts outside of restrictive covenants. And Abbate demonstrates that
courts will also apply Shelley where a covenant not involving racial
discrimination is applied in an overtly discriminatory manner to other
groups. More fundamentally, this theory really just begs the question—it
does not offer an explanation of why Shelley has been limited to its facts.
Finally, some have argued that the Court’s decision in Shelley
represents the result of balancing different constitutional rights—the
property rights of the covenant holders and the equal protection rights of
the prospective purchasers.133 This view makes sense and dovetails well
with the Court’s concern for property rights in the trespass cases discussed
above. Its main shortcoming is that it does not offer a complete explanation
of why courts find the balance tips in favor of equal protection rights in
Shelley and similar cases but tips in favor of private property rights in most
other cases.
Combining the latter two theories provides the best explanatory
framework for understanding Shelley and its progeny. Courts are generally
willing to enforce private agreements without subjecting them to equal
protection scrutiny out of respect for the private property rights that those
agreements represent. However, when an agreement explicitly requires
racial discrimination or is enforced against other groups in a discriminatory
manner, courts will not enforce it.
The reason for the more hostile attitude towards racial discrimination
than other kinds of discrimination is that the Fourteenth Amendment was
specifically concerned with eradicating racial discrimination. Although the
Equal Protection Clause is written in broad terms and has been interpreted
to prohibit many kinds of discrimination, as the Shelley Court explicitly
noted, the prevention of discrimination on the basis of race was the primary
goal of the framers of the amendment.134 This concern is also reflected in
133. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 551; Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for A
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 487–88 (1962).
134. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See e.g., David S. Elkind, State Action: Theories
for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656, 661 (1974)
(“[T]he fourteenth amendment’s foremost purpose was the eradication of certain types of racial
discrimination, as is well-documented by scholarly investigation and judicial opinion.”); Timothy Zick,
Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and “Classes of One,” 89 KY. L.J. 69, 71 (2001)
(“[I]t is widely accepted that the principal aim of the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to eradicate official antebellum discrimination against blacks . . . .”). See also Weise v. Syracuse
Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Class-based discrimination is perhaps the practice most
fundamentally opposed to the stuff of which our national heritage is composed, and by far the most evil
form of discrimination has been that based on race. It should hardly be surprising, then, that in race
discrimination cases courts have been particularly vigilant in requiring the states to avoid support of
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Equal Protection doctrine, which subjects discrimination on the basis of
race to strict scrutiny while applying lesser scrutiny to almost all other
forms of discrimination.135
Similarly, courts’ willingness to apply the Shelley rationale to stop the
enforcement of facially neutral restrictive covenants in a discriminatory
manner—even when the discrimination is not racial—ties in well with the
Supreme Court’s harsh treatment of the discriminatory application of
neutral laws in equal protection cases.136 As the Court has noted, “‘Equal
protection’ . . . emphasizes disparity in treatment . . . between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.”137 While the
Court has found no equal protection problem with facially neutral laws that
have a discriminatory impact,138 the Supreme Court and lower courts
closely scrutinize applications of facially neutral laws that treat similarly
situated people differently, particularly when the differential treatment
appears to be based on group traits such as religion or age.139 Thus, it
makes sense that courts would be reluctant to enforce neutral restrictive
covenants in a discriminatory manner.
II. THE CORE RIGHT THEORY
All the outcomes described above seem quite disparate at first glance
and, indeed, they are. However, there are some consistent themes which
recur again and again when courts are asked to use individual constitutional
rights to limit private law. Taken together, these themes provide a
framework for understanding how courts approach these cases. Courts have
shown the most willingness to place constitutional limitations on private
law when (1) the application of private law would undermine the core of
the right at issue, (2) placing constitutional limitations on private law
would not unduly threaten the constitutional rights of the parties seeking
otherwise private discrimination . . . .”).
135. See WILLIAM J. RICH, 1 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3rd ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2016).
136. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its
face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race.”).
137. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974). See also Zick, supra note 134, at 72 (noting that
non-discrimination between similarly situated groups “has remained the core principle” animating equal
protection doctrine).
138. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
139. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). See also LeClair v. Saunders, 627
F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause whenever a person
“compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and . . . such selective treatment was
based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of
constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person”).
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the private law remedy, and (3) the parties seeking constitutional protection
did not consent to the private law limitation on their conduct. While the
first factor—the level of the threat private law presents to the core of the
right—is the most critical, the other two factors operate as important
limiting principles. Although these indicators do not create a bright line
rule or explicit balancing test, they do provide guideposts that explain the
courts’ willingness to place constitutional constraints on private law in
some cases but not others. I will call this framework the Core Right
Theory. In the subsections that follow I will explain the justification for
each of the three guideposts of the Core Right Theory and then close this
section with a rebuttal to a potential critique of this theory and a response
to one alternative approach that has been proposed.
A. THE CORE RIGHT THEORY GUIDEPOSTS
1. The Core Right Guidepost
The idea of courts making distinctions between “more important”
exercises of rights and less important ones seems quite off-putting because
of the apparent value judgments inherent in such an exercise.140 But such
distinctions have long been a major part of constitutional law and are
evident across doctrines associated with several different constitutional
rights. For example, Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures are at their height in a person’s home where, subject
to a few limited exceptions, police may not conduct a search without a
warrant and a showing of probable cause.141 On the other hand, once a
person leaves the home, some kinds of searches are allowed with a lower
standard of suspicion and no warrant.142 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant in any case the right to hire
a lawyer of his or her choice because the ability to hire a lawyer of the
defendant’s choice is “the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”143
140. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485 (2004)
(criticizing the criteria the Supreme Court has used for determining which types of class legislation are
“suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause); Anne Salzman, Comment, On the Offensive: Protecting
Visual Art with Sexual Content Under the First Amendment and the “Less Valuable Speech” Label, 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 1215, 1220–21 (1994) (arguing that assigning some speech greater protection than
other speech “necessarily reflects the adjudicating body’s moral judgment of an expression’s value” and
thereby undermines the First Amendment’s goals).
141. See, e.g., Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 928–29 (D. Nev. 2012) (“Both ‘the
home and its traditional curtilage [are] given the highest protection against warrantless searches and
seizures.’”) (quoting United States v. Romero–Bustamente, 337 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003)).
142. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
143. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006).
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By contrast, the Sixth Amendment only guarantees indigent defendants
access to appointed counsel in cases where the defendant is sentenced to
incarceration.144
This greater concern for violations of the core purpose of individual
rights is a big factor in explaining when the Constitution does and does not
place limitations on private law. As the discussion in the preceding section
demonstrates, courts have been much more willing to impose these
limitations when the central purpose of a right is threatened than when
more ancillary exercises of the right are burdened.
The Sullivan line of cases places strict limitations on defamation and
related torts because those torts threaten to control speech based on its
content. Content-based controls on speech have long been subject to strict
First Amendment scrutiny because “[g]overnment action that stifles speech
on account of its message . . . contravenes th[e] essential right” at “the heart
of the First Amendment.”145 Thus, it makes sense that a tort that punishes a
person for speech on a particular topic—e.g., defamatory speech about the
plaintiff—would at least be subject to some First Amendment restrictions.
Likewise, the post-Sullivan line of cases giving greater protection to speech
about public figures and issues of public importance makes sense in light of
the Court’s view that speech about these topics is a central concern of the
First Amendment.146 Courts’ skepticism of speech-restricting injunctions
that are content-based or which restrict speech on matters of public concern
also fits well with this theme.147
By contrast, the Court has moved away from placing any serious
constitutional limitation on the use of trespass actions to remove speakers
from private property, even when that property is open to the public.
Although speech is certainly limited in these cases, courts are not enlisted
to directly enforce a content-based restriction, as they are in defamation
cases. While a property owner could choose to use the trespass laws only
on speakers she disagrees with, the court is not being used to regulate the
content of speech to the same degree as it is in a defamation action. In
defamation actions, the court specifically adjudicates whether the content
of speech is liability-triggering, whereas in trespass actions, the court
simply adjudicates where the speaker was located in order to determine
liability. In this sense, trespass actions are much more analogous to “time,
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983).
See supra Part I.B.
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place, and manner” restrictions on free speech, which have received lesser
scrutiny than content-based restrictions.148 In “time, place, and manner”
cases, it has long been a requirement that the government show that any
such restriction leaves open “ample alternative channels of
communication.”149 In most trespass cases, there are ample alternative
channels for a speaker to broadcast a message. Thus, the only time the
Court has sanctioned First Amendment limitations on trespass—in
Marsh—application of the trespass laws within the unique circumstances of
a company town would have left the speaker with no alternative avenue to
get his message to local residents.
In the context of the Equal Protection Clause and restrictive
covenants, the same pattern exists. Courts have refused to enforce only
those covenants that strike at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause—the
prohibition on racial discrimination and disparate treatment of similarly
situated groups. Other covenants and similar private agreements have
largely survived without equal protection scrutiny, even when they draw
distinctions that would receive at least some scrutiny if the government had
drawn them directly.
The determination of what constitutes the central purpose of a right is
at the center of how courts have constructed the doctrine enforcing those
rights. Courts have simply imported these judgments about what parts of
each right are really important into the private law context. The difference
is that in the private law context, only these core parts of each
constitutional right are protected. The ancillary applications of each right
that ordinarily receive at least some protection in other contexts—e.g.,
discrimination on bases other than race; time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech—receive no protection in the private law arena.
2. The Buffer Zone Guidepost
The desire to protect core constitutional values does not provide a
complete explanation for courts’ treatment of constitutional rights in
private law litigation. There are times when constitutional rights do not
limit private law causes of actions even when the application of private law
would result in the deprivation of a core constitutional right. The most
obvious example is in the selective application of trespass laws to
discriminate based on viewpoint. Although as discussed above, courts have
less involvement in content regulation there than they do in the defamation
148.
149.

See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
See id. at 802.
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context, the result is still the enforcement of a viewpoint-based speech
restriction. Speech restrictions that discriminate based on viewpoint, even
ones that are limited to a particular location, are ordinarily viewed very
skeptically by courts because they are “an egregious form of content
discrimination.”150 However, ever since its retreat from Logan Valley, the
Supreme Court has explicitly allowed such viewpoint discrimination on
private property.
The reluctance to enforce even the core meaning of constitutional
provisions in some private law cases can be explained by another factor:
the constitutional rights of private law plaintiffs. By placing limits on
private law causes of action, courts risk infringing the rights of private law
plaintiffs. For example, the courts’ unwillingness to place First Amendment
limitations on trespass actions is likely motivated at least in part by a desire
to provide breathing space for the constitutional rights of landowners—
specifically the landowners’ property and free speech rights.
The right to own property is not specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution, but the Fifth Amendment does forbid the taking of property
without just compensation.151 If a court prevents a property owner from
excluding persons that he wishes to exclude, the court is in essence taking a
portion of the property owner’s interest in the property.152 Similarly, if
courts required private property owners to allow certain speakers on their
property, the property owners might be viewed as endorsing the speakers’
messages even if they did not agree with them; such forced endorsements
of particular messages have long been understood to violate the First
Amendment.153 This solicitude for protecting other constitutional rights
may also explain courts’ reluctance to use the Equal Protection Clause to
invalidate wills and trusts that place religious restrictions on testamentary
gifts. Refusing to enforce such restrictions could burden the First
Amendment right to free religious exercise of those making the
150. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 n.11 (1979) (“[A]n essential element
of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (“[T]he Takings
Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the
instrument of the taking.”). The Court was clearly mindful of this concern when it limited Logan Valley
in Lloyd. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (noting that the due process clause and
takings clause were “also relevant to this case”).
153. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See also Rosen, supra note 95, at
473–74 (“[I]gnoring the distinction between public and private threatens what many consider to be the
core concern of the First Amendment: the protection against a government-created orthodoxy.”).
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restrictions.154
This is not to say that the ability to make religiously restrictive
testamentary gifts or use trespass laws to keep out disfavored speakers is
constitutionally protected.155 In fact, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the latter idea in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, upholding
a California court ruling extending the California Constitution’s free speech
guarantee to prevent the ejection of disfavored speakers from a private
shopping center.156 However, the desire to leave a buffer zone to avoid
having to adjudicate conflicts between competing constitutional interests is
a major factor that influences courts’ willingness to apply constitutional
rights to private law disputes.157
3. The Contract Guidepost
Another important limitation on constitutional rights in private law
disputes is most prominent in a particular kind of private law—contracts.
As described above, courts have been particularly reluctant to apply
constitutional limitations to agreements freely entered into by private
parties. Through contracts, parties may limit their speech, including by
subject matter, with no constitutional problem. As also discussed above,
this is likely rooted in the waivable nature of First Amendment rights.158 It
is also a reflection of the special role that the freedom to contract plays in
American society.159
Shelley arguably runs counter to this principle; restrictive covenants
are essentially a species of contract and yet received no similar solicitude in
that case. However, there are at least two key differences between ordinary
contracts and restrictive covenants. First, restrictive covenants run with the
land, and therefore bind parties who may not have been involved in the
154. See In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. 1975) (noting that through a testamentary
condition requiring church membership, “the testatrix sought by this bequest to further her own freeexercise interest in seeking adherents to her faith”). Cf. David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO.
L.J. 61, 89 (2012) (arguing “that testation is communicative” and thus “some restrictions on
testamentary freedom [should] trigger First Amendment scrutiny.”).
155. See In re Laning, 339 A.2d at 526 (“[W]e need not say that the testatrix had a constitutional
right to have the condition enforced, for a state may accommodate a free exercise interest which does
not amount to a constitutional right.”).
156. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
157. See Elkind, supra note 134, at 662.
158. See, e.g., Charter Commc’ns, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 304 F.3d 927, 935 n.9 (9th Cir.
2002).
159. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433,
504 n.451 (1993) (noting “the special place that contract enforcement occupies in the Court’s hierarchy
of common law principles, a position that helps explain the result in Cohen”).
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initial bargain that led to their creation.160 Second, the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants has effects on people who are not parties to
those agreements or even current owners of land subject to the covenants,
because they prevent prospective buyers of particular races from
purchasing those properties.161 Thus, while the consensual nature of
restrictive covenants may provide a further reason why courts usually do
not subject them to constitutional scrutiny, the aspects of restrictive
covenants that are nonconsensual explain why courts have made some
exceptions.
B. LIMITATIONS, POTENTIAL CRITIQUES, AND AN ALTERNATIVE
Although these guideposts are far from precise, the Core Right Theory
offers the best explanatory model for understanding the courts’ treatment of
constitutional challenges to private law. However, it is important to
understand the limitations of the claim I am making. Most importantly, this
framework is intended to be explanatory, not normative. There may be
many powerful normative critiques of the Core Right Theory, including
that it affords courts too much discretion, it overly relies on the
private/public distinction, or that it privileges contractual and private
property rights over equal protection and speech rights without
justification. An assessment of those critiques is beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, my claim is simply that this is the approach courts have
taken and that it represents the best starting point in thinking about how
courts might assess similar claims in the context of the Second
Amendment.
Perhaps the most obvious explanatory critique of the Core Right
Theory is that it ignores the role that notions of state action play in these
decisions. Some scholars have argued that the courts’ application of the
Constitution to private law cases is driven by an assessment of how much
the private party attempting to enforce a private law right is taking on a
government-like role.162 The strongest example of this kind of analysis in
these cases is in Marsh where the Court noted the government-like role that
the private entity played in running the company town. Although the Court
did not make the point explicit, scholars have also pointed to Shelley as an
160.
Indeed, that was exactly the case in Shelley. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5 (1948)
(“The trial court found that petitioners had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at the time
of the purchase.”).
161. See Belmas & Larson, supra note 130, at 68 (“The Court suggested that this case affects
outside parties; it is not merely the state enforcing a contract voluntarily entered into by private
parties.”).
162. See, e.g., sourced cited supra note 127.
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example of this phenomenon, since restrictive covenants operate much the
same way as municipal zoning laws do in controlling certain uses of
property.163
However, the question of whether a particular actor is actually an arm
of the government or acting in close concert with the government is
analytically distinct from the question of how constitutional rights apply to
private law. If a private party is actually not private, but a governmental
actor, then its actions must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny whether
or not they involve the use of private law. For example, if a publicly funded
school is a state actor, it will be unconstitutional for it to remove disfavored
speakers from its public forums whether or not that removal is
accomplished through trespass suits or through the enforcement of the
policy by school officials. Therefore, while a question about whether a
party is a state actor may be raised in a private law case, that question is
analytically distinct from the more general question about whether
particular private law causes of action must be subject to constitutional
restrictions.
While understanding and critiquing the courts’ approach to “state
action” is a worthwhile endeavor, such theories have little to tell us about
how courts approach the problem of constitutional rights and private law.
After all, in cases that clearly do not involve a private party exercising
public functions, a state action theory should yield the same results
regardless of which constitutional right is at issue and which kind of private
law is involved because the level of state involvement is always the same:
the court is enforcing the common-law right of one private individual
against another. A court adjudicating a trespass claim that suppresses
speech is (or is not) a state actor just as much as one adjudicating a libel
claim that suppresses speech, yet the latter is subject to severe
constitutional restrictions while the former is not. Thus, courts are not
making judgments in these cases about state action at all. Rather, they are
making a judgment that is tied to the constitutional right asserted in each
case and its relationship to the particular private law dispute at issue.
In the only other article so far to directly address the issue of the
Second Amendment’s application to private law, Joseph Blocher and
Darrell A.H. Miller make an alternative proposal.164 Their article—which
concerns the broader universe of “generally applicable laws” imposing
163. See id.
164. See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental
Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296–303 (2016).
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incidental burdens on the use of guns, including but not limited to private
law—disclaims any attempt “to synthesize . . . a transsubstantive approach
for evaluating the constitutional salience of incidental burdens” on
constitutional rights.165 Instead, Blocher and Miller draw on constitutional
doctrine in other areas to outline four “main forms of argument” that are
relevant to the question of whether incidental burdens on gun rights are
subject to Second Amendment scrutiny: history and tradition, the degree of
the burden imposed, the impact on the court system and on private rights of
imposing constitutional scrutiny on the incidental burden at issue, and the
purpose and design of the incidental burden.166 As they explain in their
article, each of these four modalities has some basis in the treatment of
incidental burdens in other areas of constitutional doctrine.167
While these four modalities may be helpful in understanding the way
courts treat incidental burdens generally, they are less helpful in the
specific context of private law. As an initial matter, Blocher and Miller
improperly categorize all private law burdens on constitutional rights as
incidental, when that is not always true. Private law burdens on
constitutional rights can be incidental, such as the burden neutral contract
law imposes on speech when it is used to enforce a contract limiting a
party’s speech. But private law burdens can also be direct. For example,
defamation torts directly assign liability based on the content of the
defendant’s speech. Blocher and Miller do not make this distinction, and in
failing to do so they miss the courts’ unique treatment of private law as a
distinct category of constitutional burdens (whether direct or indirect).168
I agree with Blocher and Miller that the degree of the burden on the
right at issue and the potential for interference with private rights are
factors that are relevant to courts in determining whether constitutional
scrutiny is appropriate in private law cases.169 However, their first and
fourth proposed modalities—history and tradition and the purpose of the
regulation, respectively—in my view are merely aspects of the core right
165. Id. at 331.
166. Id. at 331–33.
167. See id. at 331–347.
168. See id. at 343 (discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as an example of how the court
treats civil suits between private parties in discussing the third modality).
169. Although in my view the relevant consideration is whether other private constitutional rights
are implicated, whereas Blocher and Miller argue for a more general consideration of the impact of the
proposed constitutional limitation on “the division between public and private regulation” which
“preserve[s] a private sphere in which individuals can govern themselves.” See id. at 342. For the
reasons described supra in section II.B, I think specific constitutional rights are of more concern to
courts than general structural considerations, though structural considerations may be part of the reason
constitutional scrutiny is limited to private law burdens on core constitutional values.
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question. These factors are only relevant insomuch as they play a role in
determining the core of the constitutional right at issue. For example,
history and tradition played little role in the court’s decision in Sullivan,
which completely upended centuries of common law. Similarly, although
the purpose of the regulation does play a role in many of these cases, it
only does so because purposeful discrimination and purposeful suppression
of speech are always subject to extra scrutiny, whether courts are dealing
with public or private law. The importance the distinction between
purposeful and non-purposeful constitutional violations takes on in these
cases is simply another example of courts’ willingness to protect only the
core of constitutional rights in private law cases.
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S CORE
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, which for the first time
recognized that the Second Amendment contained an individual right to
own firearms, was a doctrinal earthquake that essentially created a new
area of constitutional law overnight. It evoked plenty of criticism170 and
praise,171 both for its reasoning and its result, but for courts and scholars it
also gave rise to a plethora of questions about the scope of this newly
recognized right. Where does an individual have a right to use a firearm?
What kind of firearms are protected by the Second Amendment? Who can
be excluded from firearm ownership?172 The intensity of the debate about
these questions is not just a product of the controversial subject matter of
gun control, but also of the lack of clarity about the scope of the Second
Amendment right provided by Heller and the Court’s unwillingness to
meaningfully revisit the Second Amendment subsequently. However, even
with all these important lingering questions, one thing that Heller and
lower courts’ subsequent efforts to apply it have made clear is that the core
of the Second Amendment right is the right of (most) individuals to keep
firearms in their homes for self-defense.
In Heller, the Court struck down the District of Columbia’s ban on
handguns and its requirement that other guns be disassembled and locked
170. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008); Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About A Well
Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267, 267–69 (2008).
171. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment: Not Constitutional Dysfunction but
Necessary Safeguard, 94 B.U. L. REV. 835, 830–40 (2014); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court
and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v. Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2009).
172. See generally Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009) (outlining
Second Amendment doctrinal questions raised by Heller).
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away when not in use.173 As the Court framed it, the case presented the
question of whether the Second Amendment174 protected “only the right to
possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service” or “an
individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia,
and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense
within the home.”175 In choosing the latter interpretation, the Court argued
at length that the Second Amendment was understood at the time it was
ratified as conferring an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected
with militia service.176 The Court held that the right to keep and bear arms
was a preexisting natural right that the Second Amendment merely
codified.177 The Court described this right as an “individual right to possess
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”178
The Court did not go into great detail about the content of this newly
recognized right, but did note that the right to use firearms for self-defense
was the “central component” of the Second Amendment right.179 The Court
also clarified that this self-defense-oriented right was most important in the
home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute.”180 The Court also noted that the Second Amendment did not confer
a right “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”181 Accordingly, the Court cautioned
that nothing in its “opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms,” which the Court described as
“presumptively lawful.”182
Since Heller, the Supreme Court has only decided one significant
173. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
174. The Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend.
II.
175. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
176. See id. at 576–619.
177. See id. at 592.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 599, 628. See also id. at 630 (referring to self-defense as the “core lawful purpose”
of the Second Amendment’s protection of firearm ownership).
180. Id. at 628. See also id. at 635 (“[The Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”).
181. Id. at 626.
182. Id. at 626–27 & n.26.
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Second Amendment case: McDonald v. City of Chicago.183 In McDonald,
the Court held that the Second Amendment was applicable to state and
local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.184 In describing the right, the Court reiterated Heller’s conclusion
“that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second
Amendment right” and that “‘the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute’ in the home . . . .”185 Aside from McDonald,
though, the Supreme Court has said almost nothing about how Second
Amendment claims should be analyzed in the near-decade since Heller.186
Despite the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have developed a relatively uniform way of looking at Second Amendment
cases that confirms the core purpose of the Second Amendment as the
preservation of a right to armed self-defense in the home. Most federal
courts of appeal have adopted a two-part test that first asks whether the law
at issue burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.187 If the law
is found to burden such conduct, courts will then apply an “appropriate”
level of scrutiny to the law, depending upon the severity of the burden on
Second Amendment rights.188 In the first step of this analysis, courts
usually look to history to determine if the conduct at issue was within the
scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of
ratification.189 At the second step, courts decide on an appropriate level of
scrutiny based on “(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”190
When employing this approach, courts have consistently defined the “core”
of the Second Amendment as “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens
183. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 742 (2010).
184. Id. at 791 (plurality opinion). Only four Justices believed that the Due Process Clause
incorporated the Second Amendment. Id. Justice Thomas also believed that the Second Amendment
was incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, but through its Privileges and
Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause. Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 767, 787 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599, 628).
186.
In Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016), in a very brief opinion, the
Court summarily revived a challenge to Massachusetts’s ban on certain stun guns. Id. at 1027–28. The
Court noted that in Heller it had rejected the assertion that the Second Amendment only protects
weapons in existence at the time of the founding—an argument the lower court had erroneously adopted
in Caetano—but provided no further guidance on how to analyze such claims. Id.
187. See Cody J. Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment “Type
of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 231, 248 & n.74 (2015) (collecting cases applying this
approach).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 249.
190. E.g., Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015).
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to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”191
The extra scrutiny given to laws burdening the right of “law-abiding”
citizens to employ armed self-defense in the home is evident in how
different kinds of firearm restrictions have fared since Heller was decided.
For example, courts have looked very skeptically at laws forbidding or
severely restricting the commercial sale of firearms and thus keeping
people from owning guns in their homes.192 Similarly, in Ezell v. City of
Chicago, the Seventh Circuit found that a Chicago ordinance banning the
operation of firing ranges warranted heightened “if not quite strict” scrutiny
because, when combined with another ordinance requiring gun owners to
have firing range training, it was a significant burden on “the core right to
possess firearms for self-defense.”193 By contrast, even relatively strict
restrictions on carrying firearms outside the home have been upheld as long
as they fall short of a complete ban on the practice.194 Likewise, laws
restricting the ownership of firearms by people who are not law-abiding or
for purposes other than self-defense have almost uniformly been upheld.195
Thus, despite the continuing uncertainty about the full scope of the Second
Amendment’s coverage, Heller and the lower courts applying it are fairly
clear on what the core right is that the Second Amendment protects.
Despite this doctrinal consensus, Blocher and Miller argue that there is
no “clear theory of the Second Amendment’s values,” and without such a
theory, there is no way to determine how burdensome any given law is to
the Second Amendment right.196 Although they concede that Heller and
McDonald establish the central component of the Second Amendment right
191. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 180 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
192. See Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, 854
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a zoning ordinance that made it very difficult to open new gun stores
burdened conduct “close” to the core of the Second Amendment and therefore warranted heightened
scrutiny); Illinois Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (striking down a total ban on gun sales in the City of Chicago).
193. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
194. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding law
requiring “good cause” for the issuance of a permit to carry a concealed weapon); Drake v. Filko, 724
F.3d 426, 434–35 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013)
(same); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (same).
195. See, e.g., Hunters United for Sunday Hunting v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 28 F. Supp. 3d 340, 346
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding “no legal support for Plaintiffs’ argument that Second Amendment protections
extend to recreational hunting”); Jacobs, supra note 187, at 251 n.83 (collecting cases upholding the
federal prohibition on domestic violence misdemeanants possessing firearms). See also Joseph Blocher,
Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 137 (2015) (“[T]he case for Second
Amendment coverage of hunting and recreation is tenuous.”).
196. Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 341, 347–48.
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as self-defense, they argue that a larger theory is necessary to understand
the purpose or value of having such a self-defense right.197 Accordingly,
they propose three theoretical approaches to the Second Amendment that
are purportedly consistent with a self-defense oriented right: (1) an
approach based on personal autonomy that is primarily concerned with “the
liberty of self-reliance rather than instrumental ends like preventing tyranny
or even promoting personal safety,” (2) an approach based on the idea that
the Second Amendment preserves a right to self-defense against the
government—that is, it acts as a bulwark against tyranny, and (3) an
approach based on personal safety—the idea that the government should
not be able to decide who can use violence to protect themselves.198
While these theories are all intriguing as potential competing
justifications for the desirability of gun ownership, only the third is
consistent with Heller. The autonomy approach explicitly disclaims the
importance of personal safety, which of course is at the heart of Heller’s
description of the right protected. As described above, Heller declared that
the Second Amendment protects a right to armed confrontation for selfdefense, and explicitly rejected the idea that the Second Amendment
protects a right to bear arms for any purpose whatsoever. Moreover, an
autonomy theory of the Second Amendment is not consistent with the
emphasis Heller and subsequent lower court opinions place on the use of
firearms in the home.199 The need for personal autonomy is the same
outside the home as it is inside of it.200 Thus, as Blocher and Miller
ultimately concede themselves, this theory is not very consistent with a
“constitutional right predicated on self-defense.”201
Blocher and Miller’s second theory fares no better in this regard.
Although Heller acknowledged that the prefatory clause of the Second
Amendment announced a purpose to maintain state militias in order to
protect against a tyrannical federal government, it also emphasized that this
was merely the purpose for codifying a pre-existing right whose central
component was personal self-defense, not defense against a tyrannical
197. Id. at 347–48.
198. Id. at 348–54.
199.
Indeed, Miller himself has argued that “[t]he home is a fault line that runs deep within the
text, context, and history of the Second Amendment . . . .” See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut:
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1310–11 (2009).
200. Blocher and Miller critique this theory as overly expansive at least in part for this reason.
See Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 349–50 (noting that an autonomy theory might suggest Second
Amendment scrutiny is applicable to a store owner’s desire to exclude a gun carrier from his store).
201. Id. at 350.
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government.202 This is confirmed further by McDonald, which noted that
by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, “the fear that the
National Government would disarm the universal militia . . . had largely
faded as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly
valued for purposes of self-defense.”203 Moreover, such a conception of the
right would be inconsistent with Heller’s express exclusion of weapons
“most useful in military service” from the Second Amendment’s
coverage204 and with lower courts’ repeated rejection of challenges to bans
on assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines.205
The only one of Blocher and Miller’s proposed theories that is
consistent with the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller and
expounded upon by the lower courts since then is the one premised on
personal safety. This theory accounts for the Second Amendment’s central
concern with self-defense, the exceptions to the right that Heller
recognized, and the interest-balancing “level of scrutiny” analysis that
lower courts have applied. In essence, Heller’s conception of the Second
Amendment embraces the theory that a populace with the choice to arm
themselves is safer than one where the government is solely responsible for
choosing who is armed. The balance can be tipped in the other direction,
however, where the cost of allowing firearm use or ownership becomes
higher than the gains to public safety. For example, while under this view a
typical law-abiding citizen with a gun generates more safety, a convicted
felon with a gun does not.
Therefore I think, contrary to Blocher and Miller, that the courts have
already made a choice between the competing theoretical justifications for
202. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595–600 (2008). See also Hollis v. Lynch,
827 F.3d 436, 447 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[S]elf-defense, not revolution, ‘is the central component of the
Second Amendment.’”) (citation omitted). The Court also noted “modern developments have limited
the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right” since “it may be true that no
amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–
28.
203. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770 (2010). See also Glenn H. Reynolds &
Brannon P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Second Amendment: A Reply to
Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. 89, 98 (2013) (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms underwent a
reinterpretation in light of the Civil War and Reconstruction. . . . Reconstruction gun-toting was
individualistic, accentuating not group rights of the citizenry but self-regarding privileges of discrete
citizens to individual self-protection.”).
204. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
205. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486, 2486 (2016); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d
991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
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an individual Second Amendment right.206 I agree with Blocher and Miller,
however, that this theoretical understanding can help provide a basis for a
better understanding of how courts might approach the questions about the
Second Amendment and private law which I will discuss in the next
section.
IV. THE CORE RIGHT THEORY APPLIED TO THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Issues related to private law and the Second Amendment have rarely
been litigated and have produced virtually no published opinions since
Heller.207 However, it is not hard to imagine a few areas of private law
where the Second Amendment could have a significant impact. Although
this is not an exhaustive list, below I will discuss five areas where the
Second Amendment is likely to intersect with private law: self-defense,
products liability, nuisance, negligent entrustment, and property rights. For
each area, I will discuss how the Second Amendment and private law might
come into conflict and how the Core Right Theory suggests courts might
analyze these issues.
A. SELF-DEFENSE
One area where the Second Amendment may be raised as an issue in
private law litigation is in cases involving self-defense itself. As described
above, the concept of self-defense is at the core of the Second Amendment
right recognized in Heller, and a few scholars have already suggested that
Heller necessarily implies an independent constitutional right to selfdefense.208 In civil cases, self-defense is understood as a person’s privilege
to use reasonable force to defend herself when she “reasonably believes”
she is threatened with “bodily harm, offensive bodily contact, or
206. This is not to say that the personal safety theory is normatively correct or more coherent than
the other theories Blocher and Miller offer. Rather, I simply claim that it is the only one of the three
theories that is consistent with the Second Amendment right as it is currently understood by the courts.
207. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248
(11th Cir. 2012) is a notable exception which is discussed infra in Part IV.E.
208. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal
Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1205, 1231 (2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 257 (2012). Of course, many have argued that the Constitution
contains a right to self-defense independent of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Jason T. Anderson,
Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 585 (2009); Anders Kaye, Comment, Dangerous Places:
The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 709
(1996).
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confinement,” even if the use of such “reasonable force would otherwise
amount to a tort such as a battery or assault . . . .”209 When deadly force is
involved, some states require a person to retreat if an opportunity to do so
is available instead of using deadly force unless that person is being
attacked in his or her home.210 Heller raises two questions about the use of
the self-defense defense in civil cases: (1) must the definition of
“reasonable force” always, or at least more often, include the use of arms;
and (2) is a duty to retreat consistent with Heller?211
What is defined as reasonable force in any particular case is a highly
fact-bound inquiry that turns on what a reasonable person under the
circumstances “would regard as permissible in view of the danger
threatening” her.212 Usually, the determination of whether force was
reasonable in a particular case is a question of fact for the jury.213 The
addition of the malice requirement in Sullivan was at least partially
motivated by concerns that juries were more likely to find negligence in
defamation cases where the underlying speech was controversial.214 A
defendant claiming self-defense might argue that juries in some places will
be similarly skeptical about the use of firearms as a means of self-defense
and that some Sullivan-like alteration of the common law is necessary to
preserve Second Amendment rights.
The Core Right Theory, however, shows that this argument is not
likely to hold much water. While self-defense is certainly at the core of the
Second Amendment, the reasonableness requirement is simply part of the
definition of what self-defense is rather than a limitation on self-defense.
The use of force which is not reasonable is, by definition, not self-defense,
but rather an offensive use of force that Heller would not sanction.215 Self209. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 7.1 (2d
ed. 2000).
210. See Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat
and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 346–47, 351–52 (2008).
211. There are also some interesting questions outside the private law context about how a
constitutional right to self-defense might apply in places such as schools or prisons, where the state
might restrict or eliminate self-defense as a defense to disciplinary action. See Brett N. v. Cmty. Unit
Sch. Dist. No. 303, No. 08 C 3092, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12444 (N.D. III. Feb. 18, 2009) (finding no
such right in the school context).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
213. See, e.g., Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 77 (Cal. 1998).
214. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
flexibility which inheres in the reasonable-care standard will create the danger that a jury will convert it
into ‘an instrument for the suppression of those “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks,” . . . which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to
prevail.’”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971)).
215. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“[W]e do not read the Second
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defense has always had a proportionality requirement, including at the
founding and earlier.216 Moreover, the buffer zone guidepost comes into
play here since sanctioning purportedly defensive violence that lacks
proportionality threatens the bodily integrity rights of others.217 Although
there may be no constitutional right to be protected from attacks by private
parties,218 the buffer zone guidepost serves to ensure that constitutional
encroachments on private law leave open ample space for the exercise of
other rights, even when the content of that space is not independently
constitutionally protected. As discussed above, courts refused to employ
the First Amendment to substantially limit trespass actions in order to
provide breathing space for the exercise of property rights, despite the lack
of a freestanding constitutional right to use trespass actions to keep out
protesters.219 Similarly, refusing to employ the Second Amendment to limit
the self-defense proportionality requirement would provide breathing space
for the exercise of bodily integrity rightsm even though there is no
freestanding right to be free from private violence. Thus, it seems unlikely
that Heller will ultimately be read to require any change to the self-defense
proportionality requirement.
Heller may figure more prominently in cases dealing with the duty to
retreat. The duty to retreat requires a person who is being physically
attacked to retreat instead of using deadly force against an attacker if an
opportunity to retreat is available.220 An exception to this requirement,
called the castle doctrine, allows the use of deadly defensive force without
a duty to retreat when a person is attacked inside his or her home.221 A
defendant asserting a self-defense claim may argue that the duty to retreat
is inconsistent with a Second Amendment right based on a “right of selfpreservation . . . permitting a citizen to repel force by force when the
intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury.”222
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation . . . .”).
216. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in SelfDefense Law, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 331, 332 & n.1 (2006).
217. See, e.g., Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The right to be free of
state-occasioned damage to a person’s bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of due process.”), abrogated on other grounds by Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1447
(5th Cir. 1993).
218. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
219. See supra Part II.A.3.
220. See Bobo, supra note 210, at 351–52.
221. See id.
222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). See Madison Fair, Note, Dare
Defend: Standing for Stand Your Ground, 38 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 155–59 (2014) (arguing that the
duty to retreat is inconsistent with the Second Amendment). See also Joshua Prince & Allen Thompson,
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Unlike the proportionality requirement, the duty to retreat is not
inherent in the concept of self-defense itself and lacks the proportionality
requirement’s clear historical pedigree.223 But does the duty to retreat really
burden the core right to armed self-defense in the home? Not to a
significant degree. The duty to retreat places some limitations on where a
person can defend themselves with deadly force—they can only do so
either (1) in the home, or (2) outside the home in places where there is no
opportunity to retreat. But limiting (and by no means eliminating) selfdefense outside the home while leaving it unburdened inside the home
tracks nicely with the core right protected by Heller. Since the need for
self-defense is “most acute” in the home224 and the duty to retreat does not
apply there, that duty does not burden the core Second Amendment
right.225
Still, there are situations when the duty to retreat could require Second
Amendment scrutiny. In particular, although every state recognizes some
version of the castle doctrine,226 some states still require a person to retreat
when she is attacked in her own home if the aggressor is also a resident of
the same home.227 Unlike the general duty to retreat, a duty to retreat while
in the home, even if the attacker is also at home, strikes at the core of the
Second Amendment right to armed self-defense in the home. Heller’s
description of the importance of using firearms “in defense of hearth and
home”228 is in tension with the idea of requiring a person to retreat from her
own home simply because she happens to share a home with the person
who is attacking her. The buffer zone concern is not applicable here since a
The Inalienable Right to Stand Your Ground, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 32, 36–46 (2015) (arguing that
the duty to retreat is inconsistent with the “natural right” of self-defense).
223. See Pamela Cole Bell, Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and
Misunderstood, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 388 (2015) (“The majority of the new states did not adopt the
English duty to retreat before using deadly force to defend against deadly force and instead allowed
those confronted with deadly force to stand their ground and not retreat.”).
224. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
225. This is not to say that the Second Amendment has no application outside the home. Most
courts that have examined the issue have either concluded that it does or assumed as much. See Drake
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 445 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). As discussed
above, the relevant question in analyzing the intersection of constitutional rights and private law is
whether the core of the constitutional right is implicated, not whether the application of private law
burdens any aspect of a constitutional right.
226. See, e.g., Lydia Zbrzeznj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 231, 274 (2012).
227. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 n.8 (Fla. 1999). See also Catherine L. Carpenter,
Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 658–59 (2003)
(“[D]ivergent opinions have emerged on the Castle Doctrine’s applicability to cohabitants”).
228. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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person has no constitutional right to physically attack someone even in his
own home; nor does he have a constitutional right to be free from violent
self-defensive measures taken by the victim (assuming those measures
meet the proportionality—and other—requirements for self-defense). Thus,
Heller likely requires that some Second Amendment scrutiny be applied to
laws placing a duty to retreat on persons who are attacked in their own
home by a cohabitant.229
B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Advocates for reducing gun violence have often proposed bringing
products liability lawsuits against gun manufacturers.230 One theory for
such lawsuits is that gun manufacturers should have integrated certain
features into their guns to make them safer, such as chamber load
indicators,231 trigger locks, or “smart gun” technologies that prevent use by
people other than the owner.232 Another theory is that weapons with
particular characteristics—such as assault weapons233—are so dangerous
that it is negligent to market them at all.234 The ability to bring suits under
these kinds of theories has been severely limited by the federal Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which immunizes gun
manufacturers from suits relating to the “criminal or unlawful misuse” of
their products.235 However, that law is quite controversial, and bills have
frequently been introduced to repeal it.236 Moreover, the PLCAA is subject
to a few narrow but important exceptions that may still allow some
litigation based on these kinds of theories.237
229. The Core Right Theory does not necessarily predict how such requirements would fare
under Second Amendment scrutiny, only that they would likely receive such scrutiny.
230. See, e.g., Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581,
1583 (2014). Such suits have been attempted before. See RICHARD C. MILLER, 4 LITIGATING TORT
CASES § 51:40, Westlaw (database updated June 2017) (describing one such case involving a lawsuit
against a major handgun manufacturer for design defect and failure to warn).
231. A chamber load indicator is a device on a gun that provides a clear indication when a round
is in the firing chamber. Jacobs, supra note 187, at 268–69.
232. See 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 109 §§ 2–5, Westlaw (database updated August 2017); Luff, supra
note 230, at 1595;
233. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding this phrase, see Jacobs, supra note 187, at
235–36 nn.9, 19.
234. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001) (rejecting a lawsuit against a gun
manufacturer brought under this kind of theory because of a statutory bar on products liability lawsuits
against gun manufacturers).
235. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902, 7903(5)(a) (2012).
236. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice for Victims of Gun Violence Act, H.R. 4399, 114th Cong
(2016).
237. For example, the PLCAA has an exception for negligent entrustment actions, as well as for
actions that occur when a defendant violates a state law applicable to firearm manufacturers. See 15
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If and when such litigation is able to move forward, a question that
will likely arise is whether the Second Amendment provides any kind of
defense for manufacturers being sued under such theories.238 Heller said
little about the types of guns that were protected by the Second
Amendment, except that it protects arms that are in “common use” and that
“handguns” qualified as such.239 The Court also noted that one of the
limitations of the Second Amendment right was that it did not extend to
“dangerous and unusual” weapons.240 Lower courts have largely
interpreted this test to mean that weapons that are commonly owned—
those that are owned by large raw numbers of people—are protected.241 A
gun manufacturer in a products liability case who is being sued on a theory
either that a gun is simply too dangerous to market to the public or that a
gun should have incorporated a better alternative design (i.e., certain safety
features) could argue that it cannot be held liable for marketing a gun that
is commonly owned and, thus, protected by the Second Amendment.
A threshold question under either theory is whether the Second
Amendment guarantees some right to manufacture and sell firearms.
Although few courts have dealt with the issue, those that have analyzed it
have almost all concluded that the Second Amendment does guarantee
some right to sell firearms.242 While no court so far has examined the
manufacturing issue, Josh Blackman has made a compelling argument that
a corresponding manufacturing right exists.243 These conclusions make
sense. Without a right to sell or manufacture firearms, the government
U.S.C. § 7903(5)(ii)–(iii). Some victims of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting have used
these exceptions to craft a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the gun involved in that shooting, based
on a theory that marketing such a lethal assault rifle to the general public constituted negligent
entrustment and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. See Soto v. Bushmaster
Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. FBTCV156048103S, 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1270, at *1–2 (Super. Ct.
Apr. 14, 2016).
238. See Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting an argument
that the Second Amendment provided a defense to an action against gun manufacturers for negligent
marketing of handguns based on a militia-centric understanding of the Second Amendment).
239. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–82, 624, 628–29 (2008).
240. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
241. Jacobs, supra note 187, at 263–64. As I have argued elsewhere, this test raises many
questions and seems somewhat at odds with a self-defense based right. Id. at 263–78.
242. See Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, 854
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3rd Cir. 2010); Illinois
Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2014). But see
United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Chafin has not pointed this court to
any authority, and we have found none, that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the
Second Amendment was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm.”).
243. Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L.
REV. 479, 496 (2014).
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could get around the Second Amendment entirely by banning the sale or
production of guns. For the same reason, the right to sell and manufacture
firearms must be part of the core of the Second Amendment right, since it
would be impossible for citizens to keep arms for self-defense in the home
without the ability to purchase firearms. However, the Court specifically
noted in Heller that “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms” were presumptively lawful.244 Thus, while the
core of the Second Amendment right does include the right to sell and
manufacture firearms, the state has at least some ability to regulate that
aspect of the right.
How the Core Right Theory would apply to a products liability suit
depends upon the theory of liability that is being pursued against a gun
manufacturer. On the theory that a particular gun is simply too dangerous
on the whole to market to the general public (i.e., that its risk outweighs its
utility), whether the right to that particular gun is at the core of the Second
Amendment right would probably depend on whether the gun at issue is
commonly owned.245 If it is, then a gun manufacturer would be able to
claim that some form of Second Amendment scrutiny should apply. Of
course, the fact that the Second Amendment would apply to such a suit
does not necessarily mean that the suit would fail. Rather, the plaintiffs
would have to satisfy some additional burden to show that holding the
company liable for marketing this particular weapon is consistent with the
Second Amendment, perhaps through the application of means-end
scrutiny.246 On the other hand, if the gun at issue was not common, then no
Second Amendment scrutiny would be likely, as the suit would not threaten
core Second Amendment rights.
A safer alternative design theory presents more complex questions.
Heller never specified the level of generality to be applied in determining
whether a weapon is “common,” and few lower courts have expounded
upon the question.247 Is a court supposed to look to just the general class of
weapon (handguns), to the specific model (Glock 27), or to the specific
feature at issue in the litigation (handguns without chamber load
244. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
245. Determining whether a gun falls into this category is much easier said than done, however.
See Jacobs, supra note 187, at 264 n.148, 272–75.
246. For example, almost all courts to have considered challenges to bans on assault weapons
have concluded that those bans burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment but have still
upheld them under the applicable form of means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2015); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d
1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
247. Jacobs, supra note 187, at 264 n.148.
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indicators)? In the absence of further guidance on this issue, the Core Right
Theory suggests that courts should look at whether the proposed alternative
design feature would significantly impact the gun’s utility for self-defense
purposes. If it does, then Second Amendment scrutiny may be warranted;
the core of the Second Amendment right might be implicated if tort law
required the gun to be significantly less helpful for self-defense.
Conversely, if the proposed alternative design would have little or no
impact on self-defense, core Second Amendment rights would not be
implicated and the court could evaluate the proposed alternative design in
the same manner as it would in any design-defect case.248
C. NUISANCE
Nuisance law could also intersect with the Second Amendment. An
action for nuisance can either be based on a public nuisance or a private
nuisance.249 “A public nuisance consists of an unreasonable interference
with the exercise of a right common to the general public,”250 whether or
not the defendant’s creation of the nuisance arises from the use of real
property, whereas a “private nuisance is confined to situations where one
person’s property use interferes with another’s use of neighboring or
adjoining property.”251 Both types of nuisance actions may implicate the
Second Amendment. Public nuisance actions have been brought against
gun manufacturers and dealers under the theory that they have either
deliberately or negligently allowed guns to fall into the hands of people
who are prohibited from owning them, such as juveniles and felons.252
Private nuisance actions have sometimes been brought against firing ranges
248. Lawsuits brought by gun owners involving breaches of warranty or implied warranty are less
likely to be subject to Second Amendment scrutiny, even if the breach of warranty involves a common
gun or a gun feature that implicates self-defense. That is because such an action would arise under a
contractual relationship into which the gun manufacturer willingly entered. As the contract guidepost
shows, when a party willingly enters a contract, it has far less ground to complain that the contract
violates its constitutional rights. See supra Part II.A.3. Moreover, suits for breaches of warranty are less
likely to burden core Second Amendment rights since such suits do not target particular guns as
completely unfit for the marketplace, nor are such suits likely to impact the self-defense utility of a gun.
See 77A C.J.S. Sales § 443 (2017) (“A manufacturer’s liability for product defects under implied
warranty may not be premised on the existence of an obvious hazard in a product which functions
properly for its intended purpose.”).
249. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 7 (2017).
250. Id. § 8.
251. Id. § 9.
252. See 84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 109 § 21 (2002). Often, these public nuisance actions have been
brought by municipalities. See David Kairys, Public Nuisance Claims of Victims of Handgun Violence,
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (2001). However, my focus is on private plaintiffs, since actions by
municipalities are not really applications of private law but rather are more analogous to direct
government regulatory action.
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because of excessive noise and other potential hazards associated with such
establishments.253
Actions for public nuisance against gun manufacturers and dealers
based on those manufacturers and dealers allowing weapons to fall into the
wrong hands are unlikely to warrant Second Amendment scrutiny.
Although, as discussed above, the Second Amendment does likely contain
at or near its core a right to manufacture and sell weapons, that core right is
specifically limited to people who are law-abiding and responsible.254 An
action based on an allegation that manufacturers and gun dealers are selling
guns to people who are not law-abiding (like convicted felons) or otherwise
responsible (like minors) thus does not target conduct at the core of the
Second Amendment right. Although some types of criminal record based
prohibitions on gun ownership may be inconsistent with Heller, these
prohibitions nevertheless fall outside the core of the Second Amendment
right,255 and therefore a public nuisance lawsuit based on a manufacturer or
dealer circumventing those provisions is unlikely to warrant Second
Amendment scrutiny.
Actions based on private nuisance against gun ranges present a more
difficult question. In Ezell, discussed supra in Part III, the Seventh Circuit
held that the ability to train to use firearms at a firing range is protected
under the Second Amendment, and that Chicago’s restrictions on such
firing ranges placed a significant burden on the core of the Second
Amendment right.256 Although it is true that Chicago also required range
training in order to obtain a license to own a firearm in the city, the court’s
conclusion was not entirely based on that requirement. The court
specifically found that “the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use [is]
an important corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right to
possess firearms for self-defense.”257 Thus, like the right to sell and
253. See, e.g., Yates v. Kemp, 979 N.E.2d 678, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (private nuisance suit
based on the manner in which the defendant operated a gun range); Vermillion v. Pioneer Gun Club,
918 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (suit against a gun club for private nuisance based on
“bullets . . . straying onto [the plaintiffs’] property”); Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun
Ranch, LLC, 228 P.3d 1134, 1137 (Mont. 2010) (private nuisance suit against a shooting range based
upon the danger posed by its “close proximity to a subdivision and an elementary school”); Shaw v.
Coleman, 645 S.E.2d 252, 258 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a shooting range to be a nuisance because
of, among other factors, excessive noise).
254. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
255.
Indeed, almost no prohibitions against firearm possession based on criminal conduct have
been struck down since Heller. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION
SUMMARY 14–16 (2017), http://smartgunlaws.org/post-heller-litigation-summary.
256. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704–06, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011).
257. Id. at 708.
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manufacture firearms, the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use
through range training is probably part of the core Second Amendment
right.
Since nuisance actions often seek the end of the activity targeted, a
nuisance action against a gun range may trigger some kind of Second
Amendment scrutiny. The Second Amendment concerns would likely be
incorporated into the existing framework for nuisance analysis. A private
nuisance only exists where the conduct complained of is “unreasonable:”
the conduct’s utility is outweighed by the harm it causes to the plaintiff.258
In determining the utility of particular conduct, courts look to “(a) the
social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the
impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.”259 In the case of
firing ranges, courts could consider the value of firing ranges as “an
important corollary” to the exercise of Second Amendment rights when
determining their social value. Courts could also consider the availability of
other firing ranges in the area when thinking about the suitability of a firing
range to the character of the locality.260 And courts could also avoid
Second Amendment problems by requiring remedial measures to make
firing ranges less bothersome to surrounding property owners, or using the
remedy of damages instead of an injunction.
The buffer zone guidepost may come into play here since the right to
be free from nuisances is arguably a stick in the bundle of rights associated
with ownership of a piece of property.261 However, the limitations on
nuisance actions described above merely incorporate Second Amendment
interests into existing (and longstanding) nuisance doctrine. The Second
Amendment may change some of the considerations that courts look at in
determining the public utility of firing ranges, but the overall calculus of
utility versus harm (and the right to bring a nuisance action) remains the
same. The utility side of the nuisance inquiry changes with the times as
258. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
259. Id. § 828.
260. Cf. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 711 (“[T]he City may promulgate zoning and safety regulations
governing the operation of ranges not inconsistent with the Second Amendment rights of its citizens.”);
id. at 714–15 (Rovner, J., concurring) (“The City has a right to impose reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions on the operation of live ranges in the interest of public safety and other legitimate
governmental concerns.”).
261. See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 218–19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[P]ossessory rights to real property include as distinct interests the right to exclude and the right to
enjoy, violations of which give rise to the distinct causes of action respectively of trespass and
nuisance.”).
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activities that once had utility no longer do, and vice versa.262 The changes
to the inquiry to protect Second Amendment interests would simply be a
continuation of that tradition, rather than a new limitation on private
property rights. Thus, applying the Core Right Theory here suggests that
the Second Amendment would likely have some application in private
nuisance actions against gun ranges,263 albeit in a form that would likely
leave plenty of room for such actions to continue unabated.
D. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
Negligent entrustment and related actions are also an area where the
Second Amendment could arguably have private law implications.264
Negligent entrustment occurs when the defendant permits a third person to
use a thing and the defendant knows or should know that the third person is
likely to use it to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.265
There are two theories of negligent entrustment actions involving guns
that likely have different implications under the Core Right Theory. One
theory is that a defendant consciously gave or (more often) sold a firearm
to a person who later hurt someone with it, when the defendant should have
known that the recipient would do something bad with the firearm.266
Another theory is that a defendant failed to safely secure a firearm,
allowing it to fall into the hands of someone who used it to cause harm.267
As to the first theory, the analysis would probably be fairly similar to
262. See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist
Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 682, 692–94 (1995).
263. Similar logic would likely apply to private nuisance actions against gun stores and
manufacturers.
264. Actions for negligent entrustment are specifically exempt from the PLCAA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 7903(5)(A)(ii) (2012).
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
266. See, e.g., Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 9–10 (Kan. 2013) (allowing a plaintiff to proceed
with a negligent entrustment action based on a pawn shop’s sale of a firearm to a convicted felon who
subsequently used the firearm to murder the plaintiff’s son); Splawnik v. Di Caprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615,
335–36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (allowing negligent entrustment action to proceed where the defendant
“had reason to know [the recipient of a gun] was likely, because of her depressed mental state, to use it
in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to herself”).
267. See Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage of
Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2000). There is some dispute about whether this theory
technically qualifies as negligent entrustment or is an analytically distinct “negligent storage” theory.
Compare id. at 1214 n.193 (“Although there is a potential for overlap, the theory of negligent storage
must be distinguished from the theory of negligent entrustment.”), with 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 78 (2017)
(“Negligent entrustment can include both affirmative entrustment of a firearm to an unsuitable person
and failure to properly secure a firearm . . . .”). The distinction is not particularly important for this
Article’s purposes. However it is classified, the tort requires a failure to adequately store a firearm,
resulting in someone gaining access to the firearm and injuring themselves or someone else.
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public nuisance actions based on negligent marketing—there is likely no
Second Amendment issue if a lawsuit merely targets a dealer for selling to
someone who is not law-abiding or responsible. Unlike most public
nuisance actions though, negligent entrustment actions may involve
transfers to persons who, though not legally barred by a criminal conviction
from owning firearms, are nevertheless persons who the defendant should
have known would be likely to do harm with a firearm. For example, in
Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., a Florida court found the plaintiff had
stated a claim for negligence when the defendant sold a gun to the
plaintiff’s attacker, even though when the attacker entered the defendant’s
store, “[h]er eyes were glazed and she was laughing and giggling as she
hugged and kissed one of the employees who was a total stranger to her”
and she “repeatedly aimed [a gun] at [an employee’s] head, pulling the
trigger.”268 In cases like this, although the attacker may have been
otherwise law-abiding, she arguably was not responsible. Moreover,
restricting gun stores from selling to people exhibiting strange behavior
arguably also falls under Heller’s exception for “conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”269 Thus, negligent
entrustment actions based on deliberate transfers of a firearm to another
person are unlikely to implicate the Second Amendment.
The Second Amendment is likely to be more relevant in actions based
on a theory of failure to secure a firearm that was then taken by someone
who should not have had access to it. In these cases, tort law imposes a
duty on gun owners to lock their guns away in a particular manner—the
same objective as the safe storage law struck down in Heller. The Court
found that law “ma[de] it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the
core lawful purpose of self-defense.”270 As Blocher and Miller point out, if
courts were to hold that negligence law created the same duty of care for
gun owners as that required by the law in Heller, that would plainly
implicate, and likely be inconsistent with, the Second Amendment.271 Thus,
whatever duty of care gun owners have to keep their weapons secured, it
must be consistent with the ability to use those weapons for self-defense.272
268. Angell v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
269. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). See also Colo. Outfitters Ass’n
v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1074 (D. Colo. 2014) (expressing “grave doubt” that a law
requiring background checks on all firearm transfers “implicates the Second Amendment’s guarantee at
all”), vacated, 823 F.3d 537 (10th Cir. 2016).
270. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
271. Blocher & Miller, supra note 164, at 296–97.
272. By contrast, there would likely be no Second Amendment issue with lawsuits aimed at gun
dealers who fail to adequately secure firearms. See generally Michael T. Pedone, Note, Valentine v. On
Target, Inc.: It Is Time to Hold Gun Dealers Accountable for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 60
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The treatment of safe-storage provisions by courts since Heller
provides some insight into how courts might harmonize the Second
Amendment with the duty of care in “failure to secure” negligent
entrustment cases. The two major cases to have analyzed safe storage
requirements after Heller both upheld laws requiring firearms to be
equipped with a trigger lock or put in a safe when not under the owner’s
immediate control.273 In both cases, the courts distinguished those laws
from Heller on the grounds that they had an exception for when the firearm
was in the owner’s immediate control, and therefore allowed the owner to
use guns for self-defense in the home.274 Using these cases as a guide,
courts would likely find that negligent entrustment actions could place a
duty on gun owners to secure their weapons as long as that duty did not
extend to times when the weapon was in use or under the owner’s direct
control.275
E. PROPERTY RIGHTS
Private property rights were often at the center of disputes over the
applicability of other constitutional provisions to private law, and the
Second Amendment will likely be no different.276 Two different contexts
for these kinds of disputes have received some attention from the courts
and in scholarship. First, does the Second Amendment limit the ability of
property owners to keep guns off their property, even when that property is
otherwise open to the public? Second, does the Second Amendment place
any limitations on the ability of homeowners to enforce restrictive
covenants or homeowners’ association rules prohibiting firearms in
MD. L. REV. 441 (2001) (discussing such claims). Placing a duty on gun dealers to store their weapons
in a particular way does not impact the right to use arms for self-defense in the home.
273. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 963–66 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015); Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 502–04 (Mass. 2013).
274. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 963–65; McGowan, 982 N.E.2d at 502–04.
275. At least two Supreme Court Justices have voiced concern with the holdings in these cases,
because safe storage requirements create a delay in a gun owner’s ability to access a firearm in an
emergency and therefore burden the right to self-defense in the home. See Jackson, 135 S. Ct. at 2800
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent).
However, Heller specifically mentioned that some safe storage provisions could pass muster under the
Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (“[O]ur analysis [does not] suggest the invalidity of
laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”). Since “[a]ny law regulating the storage
of firearms will delay to some degree the ability of a firearm owner to retrieve and fire the firearm in
self-defense,” it must be that at least some delay is acceptable under the Second Amendment.
McGowan, 982 N.E.2d at 503. In any case, it is doubtful that the core of the Second Amendment right
is implicated by a requirement that guns be kept locked up except when under the owner’s control, even
if such requirements may implicate non-core aspects of the Second Amendment right (e.g., the speed of
retrieval).
276. See supra Parts I.D & I.E.
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housing developments?
The conflict between the Second Amendment and private property
rights is one of the few areas where a court has actually weighed in on
Heller’s impact on private law. In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, the
Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to a state law preventing people
from carrying guns into places of worship without the explicit permission
of the owner of the place of worship.277 In rejecting that challenge, the
buffer zone guidepost loomed large in the court’s analysis. The court
described the well-established colonial and pre-colonial history of the
private property right to exclude trespassers, and concluded that “[a]n
individual’s right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment,
whatever its full scope, certainly must be limited by the equally
fundamental right of a private property owner to exercise exclusive
dominion and control over its land.”278 Much like in the Logan Valley line
of cases, although business owners may not have an affirmative
constitutional right to keep guns off their property,279 by refusing to employ
the Second Amendment to require property owners to allow guns on their
property, the court protected a breathing space for private property rights.
The core right guidepost further reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s
conclusion. As discussed above in several other contexts, the right to carry
firearms outside of the home, whatever its scope, likely falls outside of the
core of the Second Amendment right. Even if the right to carry outside the
home did implicate the core of the Second Amendment, it does not
automatically follow that a right to carry on private property is a part of
that core. Moreover, forcing a business to have a gun on its property that it
does not want there may itself violate the Second Amendment’s core
principles. Blocher has argued that the Second Amendment protects a right
“not to keep and bear arms,” because such a right would further the core
Second Amendment value—self-defense—by allowing people to choose
whether to accept the personal safety risk associated with a gun’s presence
on their property.280 Forcing business owners to allow guns on their
property may or may not violate that right,281 but if the Second Amendment
contains some right not to bear arms, it likely does not require private
businesses to allow guns on their property. Finally, the consent guidepost
277. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2012).
278. Id. at 1261–63, 1265.
279. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding an
Oklahoma law requiring businesses to allow employees to keep guns in their cars).
280. Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2012).
281. See id. at 41–45.
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plays a role here as well, since businesses often post notices on their
property indicating that anyone who enters must agree to not carry firearms
on the premises. If a person freely agrees to bargain away his or her Second
Amendment rights in exchange for being allowed into a business, courts
will be unlikely to find a violation of those rights.
Many housing developments have used restrictive covenants or
homeowners’ association (HOA) rules to prohibit the possession of
firearms in homes in those developments.282 Although not yet litigated,283 a
gun owner challenging such a restriction might argue that it is analogous to
the restrictions struck down in Shelley.284 The Core Right Theory points
towards such restrictions receiving some constitutional scrutiny. Such
restrictions—at least where they completely ban possession of all guns in
the home—undoubtedly burden the core of Second Amendment. On the
other hand, a restrictive covenant or an HOA agreement is a property right,
and any application of the Second Amendment would threaten that
property right.285 Moreover, HOAs and restrictive covenants are voluntary
agreements, and they generally receive the deference courts pay to such
agreements when determining whether to apply the Constitution to private
law. But, as Shelley demonstrates, when a restrictive covenant or HOA
directly burdens the core of a right, it may be subject to constitutional
scrutiny despite the property rights involved and the consensual nature of
these agreements. As discussed in Part I.E, HOAs and restrictive covenants
are not like most ordinary contracts because they—by design—impact nonparties to the original agreement.286
However, the fact that an attempt to enforce such a “no guns”
restriction would be subject to constitutional scrutiny is not the end of the
282. See John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the Door:
Questioning the Validity of Restrictive Covenants Against the Right to Bear Arms, 35 SW. U. L. REV.
551, 551–52 (2007); Christopher J. Wahl, Comment, Keeping Heller Out of the Home: Homeowners
Associations and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1003, 1003 n.5 (2013).
283. The pressure of threatened litigation may have forced some HOAs to withdraw proposed
gun bans. See Wahl, supra note 282, at 1003 & n.6.
284. See Fritz, supra note 282, at 551–52 & 565 (making a version of this argument pre-Heller).
285. See, e.g., Leigh v. Village of Los Lunas, 108 P.3d 525, 529 (N.M. 2004) (“Restrictive
covenants constitute valuable property rights.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although some jurisdictions do not consider a restrictive covenant to be a property right for takings
purposes, because they consider them to be contractual rights, see id. at 530, contractual rights are still
an important interest with constitutional dimensions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”).
286. A similar restriction in a lease, by contrast, would likely not be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Unlike a restrictive covenant or HOA rule, a lease provision would not have adverse impacts
on third parties beyond those who negotiated the lease. Instead, a lease would be much more like an
ordinary contract, and therefore unlikely to receive constitutional scrutiny.
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inquiry. A court looking at such a restriction would have to conduct a full
Second Amendment analysis, including selecting an appropriate level of
scrutiny and applying that level of scrutiny to the restriction at issue (which
would necessarily include considering the justifications for the restriction
in that particular development). It may seem obvious that strict scrutiny
should apply to these restrictions, given their similarity to the law struck
down in Heller. However, the fact that these restrictions emanate from an
agreement among private parties, and that a prospective home purchaser
who wishes to use firearms for self-defense may simply choose to live
elsewhere, may lessen the burden on the Second Amendment and counsel
in favor of a lower level of scrutiny, even though these same factors would
probably not be sufficient to shield such restrictions from all scrutiny.
Thus, while the Second Amendment would likely apply to such
restrictions, that does not automatically mean they would be unenforceable
in all circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The Core Right Theory provides a sound framework for understanding
courts’ approach to questions about the intersection of private law and
constitutional rights generally. Consequently, applying that theory guides
our understanding of how courts may address these intersections in the
Second Amendment context. However, the Core Right Theory is only
explanatory; I make no claims about its normative value. The Second
Amendment’s post-Heller development presents courts and scholars with a
unique opportunity to look at old doctrines in a new light, and the way that
constitutional rights and private law are integrated may be one area that
deserves a fresh look. But in order for that to happen, we must first develop
a coherent understanding of what courts have done in this area up to this
point. The Core Right Theory provides an important tool for moving in that
direction.

